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ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS:
BRADY V. MARYLAND IN THE PLEA
BARGAINING CONTEXT
CORINNA BARRETT LAIN*

Too often, what the process purports to secure in its formal stages can
be subverted or diluted at its more informal stages. 1
Since at least the 1960s, the plea bargaining rate for American criminal
cases has been around 90%. 2 Still, the fact that so many defendants prefer to

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Richmond. J.D., University of Virginia, 1996;
B.A., College of William & Mary, 1992 (economics). I would like to thank Pamela Karlan for
generously providing the ideas to get this project started back in 1996 and my former colleagues at the
Henrico County, Virginia, Commonwealth Attorney's Office for sharing with me their experiences
and perspectives on this topic. Special thanks also go to Earl C. Dudley, Jr., John G. Douglass, Mark
Strasser, Lawrence Solum, Scott Matheson and Steven Hubacheck for their insightful comments in
developing this Article, and John Lain for his confidence, encouragement, and support.
1. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642,644 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2. Guilty pleas disposed of approximately 95% of all federal cases prosecuted in 1999, and
approximately 93% in 1997 and 1998. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1999, 429 tb1.5.30 (Ann L. Pastore & Kathleen
Maguire eds., 1999). Guilty pleas disposed of 91% of all felony cases prosecuted at the state level in
1996, the most recent year for which data is available. /d. at 454 tb1.5.51. Scholars have noted the
predominance of plea bargaining for at least three decades, with some arguing that economic necessity
demands it. See, e.g., DONALD J. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR
INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL 3 (Frank J. Remington ed., 1966) (noting studies concluding that
approximately 90% of all criminal defendants pleaded guilty); Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra,
Plea Bargaining as Due Process in Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REv. 887, 895 n.40 (1980) (citing
John Kaplan, American Merchandising and the Guilty Plea: Replacing the Bazaar with the
Department Store, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215,220 (1977)) (noting that expenditures on the criminal justice
system would have to double if guilty plea disposition rates were reduced to 80% of all criminal cases,
and expenditures would triple if the figure were reduced to 70%); H. Richard Uviller, Pleading Guilty:
A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 102, 105 (1977) (explaining that economic
necessity requires a plea disposition rate of 90% or higher). See also Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992) ("[Plea Bargaining) is not
some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.").
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confess their guilt in open court rather than take their chances at trial
continues to intrigue us. 3 Surely the predominance of plea bargaining at least
means that it makes defendants better-off; otherwise they would not strike
the deals. 4 After all, defendants must make a choice-they cannot trade in
their trial rights and exercise them too. Sometimes, however, they can. A few
select rights traditionally associated with trial are so essential to protecting
the innocent from wrongful conviction that defendants retain them even
though they choose to plea bargain. 5 In short, these so-called "trial rights"
protect the nontrial, guilty plea defendant too. The Sixth Amendment right to
6
counsel is one example of such a right. Is Brady v. Maryland's 1 duty to
disclose yet another?
Decided in 1963, Brady v. Maryland imposes on prosecutors a duty to
share with defendants information· favorable to the defense and material to
guilt or punishment. 8 Under Brady and its progeny, prosecutors must disclose
impeachment as well as exculpatory information,9 and are not excused from

3. Scholars have long debated the merits of plea bargaining. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook,
Criminal Procedure] (describing plea bargaining as a well-functioning market system that efficiently
sets the price of crime), and Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J.
1969 (1992) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining] (arguing that plea bargaining is at least as
effective as trial in separating the guilty from the innocent), with Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme
Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. I (1975) (maintaining that plea
bargaining is inherently involuntary), and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101
YALE L.J. 1979 (1992) (concluding that plea bargaining should be abolished based on economic
analysis). For a more moderate approach, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2 (defending plea bargaining
using contract principles while recognizing the need for reform).
4. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 309.
5. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 21.6(a), at 1014-17 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing constitutional rights not forfeited by a guilty plea).
6. The Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is no less important to the guilty plea
defendant than it is to the defendant who stands trial. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721-22
(1948); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475 (1945). Thus, even plea bargaining defendants may
later raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,57 (1985). The
Court has repeatedly relied on the right to counsel as a primary means of assuring that innocents do not
falsely plead guilty. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (identifying
competent counsel as a safeguard against false self-condemnation); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S.
258, 266-67 ( 1973) (assuming defendant's confession of guilt is accurate absent ineffective assistance
of counsel); Von Moltke, 332 U.S. at 721-22 (emphasizing counsel's role in assessing defendant's guilt
to advise her on proper plea). See also William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75
VA. L. REv. 761, 830-31 (1989) (concluding that attorneys are provided to guilty plea defendants
because they are necessary for factually accurate pleas). But see Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55-58
(arguing that the Supreme Court's reliance on counsel to prevent false conviction of innocents in the
plea bargaining context is misplaced).
7. 373 u.s. 83 (1963).
8. /d. at 87-88.
9. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-55 (1972). See also infra note 157 and
accompanying text (explaining distinction between impeachment and exculpatory information).
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nondisclosure even if they never received a request for the information 10 or
were unaware that the government had it to give. 11 At least in some ways,
then, Brady's duty to disclose is quite broad. 12 The question is whether it is
broad enough to protect defendants who plead guilty as well as those who
take their chances at trial, where Brady was originally decided. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has only considered a defendant's Brady rights in the trial
context, 13 and has therefore never had occasion to answer this question
(though it has recently agreed to do so). 14 Moreover, the Court's prior Brady
decisions give no hint-even in dicta-as to. what the answer to this question
might be. 15 That being the case, ail one can say with certainty is that the

10. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) ("In United States v. Agurs, however, it
became clear that a defendant's failure to request favorable evidence did not leave the [g]overnment
free of all obligation.") (citation omitted); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (holding
that some evidence favorable to the defense is so valuable that due process requires its disclosure even
without a specific request).
11. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38.
12. In other ways, however, the duty is quite narrow. For example, Brady does not require the
disclosure of tactical information, such as the fact that a witness has died. See, e.g., People v. Jones,
375 N.E.2d 41, 43-44 (N.Y. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978). Furthermore, Brady only
requires the disclosure of favorable information that meets a narrow definition of materiality. See
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 699-705 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (lamenting the
exacting nature of Brady's materiality standard in part because it permits prosecutors to withhold large
amounts of favorable evidence with impunity). For a discussion of Brady's materiality standard in the
trial context, see infra text accompanying notes 97-100. For a discussion of Brady's materiality
standard in the plea bargaining context, see infra Part Ill.
13. See Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000)
("The Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose material
exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea violates the U.S. Constitution.") (footnote
omitted). The Court's application of Brady in only the trial context is particularly notable given the
overwhelming number of cases resolved by guilty plea since at least the 1960s. See supra note 2.
14. See United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 803 (2002)
(mem.). At issue in the Supreme Court's review of Ruiz are two questions: (I) whether a defendant has
a right to Brady information before pleading guilty, and (2) if so, whether that right may be waived
through a plea agreement. 70 U.S.L.W. 3418 (U.S. Jan 8, 2002) (No. 01-595). I address only the first
of those questions in the analysis below, though the Supreme Court has also suggested that some rights
are so essential to protecting the innocent that they may never be waived. See United States v.
Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204 ( 1995) ("There may be some evidentiary provisions that are so
fundamental to the reliability of the factfinding process that they may never be waived without
irreparably 'discredit[ing] the federal courts'." (citing 21 Wright & Grakam § 5039, at 207-08)).
Whether Brady is one of those rights is a separate question entirely, especially given the conclusions
we can draw about defendants willing to explicitly waive theirBrady rights and plead guilty in the
dark. See infra text accompanying notes 167-70. In any event, I make no conclusions about the
legitimacy of Brady waivers; my only point here is that the same considerations would appear to be
relevant in deciding both questions. For an analysis of the waiver issue, see Daniel P. Blank, Plea
Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist's Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68
FORDHAM L. REV. 2011 (2000) (analyzing plea bargains that explicitly waive a defendant's Brady
rights); Erica G. Franklin, Note, Waiving Prosecutorial Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process: A
Debate on the Merits of "Discovery" Waivers, 51 STAN. L. REv. 567 (1999) (same).
15. John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bargaining,
50 EMORY L.J. 437,440-41 (2001). Thus far, the closest the Court has come to directly addressing the
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Supreme Court has been extremely reluctant to recognize any rights r~tained
by defendants who plead guilty, preferring instead to protect the fina,lity of
convictions resting on a guilty plea. 16
Even so, providing Brady protections to those who plead guilty has
intuitive appeal. If due process prevents prosecutors from obtaining
convictions at trial by suppressing favorable evidence, one would think it
would also prevent them from obtaining bargained-for convictions by doing
the same thing. 17 Reflecting the ambiguity of the issue, state and federal
courts across the country are split as to whether defendants who plead guilty
can nevertheless claim Brady's protections 18-and even those jurisdictions
holding that Brady does protect the guilty plea defendant disagree as to how
to doctrinally justify that result. 19 Given the complete lack of consensus on
this topic and its obvious practical import, it is especially surprising that few

topic appears to be a three-justice dissent to the denial of a writ of certiorari in Neely v. Pennsylvania,
411 U.S. 954 ( 1973). In Neely, the defendant learned of impeachment material after his guilty plea but
before sentencing and wished to withdraw his plea. !d. at 955-56. Dissenting Justices Douglas,
Stewart, and Marshall agreed that the writ should have been granted, citing Brady and noting that "a
guilty plea should not be a trap for the unwary or unwilling." !d. at 958. Unfortunately, Neely offers
little as a predictor of the Supreme Court's current position on this issue given changes in the
composition of the Court and the unique, pre-sentence procedural posture of the case. See id. at 957-58
(focusing analysis on government's lack of prejudice from defendant's early withdrawal of plea).
16. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 463-65; Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosure and Accuracy in
the Guilty Plea Process, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 957, 1020 (1989). See also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 3839 (explaining the rationale supporting the Supreme Court's finality doctrine).
17. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 439.
18. The Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all been willing to consider a
guilty plea defendant's Brady claim on its merits. See infra Part I. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, by
contrast, have held that a guilty plea defendant on habeas corpus review has no Brady rights, see, e.g.,
Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353,360 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 830 (2000); Jones v. Bryant,
No. 00-3014, 2001 WL 1637665, at *I (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 2001), while a number of other state and
federal courts have more generally held that Brady claims are barred by a defendant's guilty plea. See,
e.g., Indelicato v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 2d 151, 156-58 (D. Mass. 2000); Telepo v.
Scheidemantel, 737 F. Supp. 299, 305-06 (D.N.J. 1990); United States v. Ayala, 690 F. Supp. 1014,
1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Wolczik, 480 F. Supp. 1205, 1210-11 (W.O. Pa. 1979);
United States v. Autullo, Nos. 88-CR91-4, 93-C4415, 1993 WL 453446, at •2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1993);
State v. Reed, 592 P.2d 381, 382 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Martin, 495 A.2d 1028, 1032-33
(Conn. 1985); State v. Kaye, 423 A.2d 1002, 1005 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1980); People v.
Williams, 548 N.Y.S.2d 772, 773 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); People v. Day, 541 N.Y.S.2d 463,467 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1989); Adame v. State, No. 07-99-0033-CR, 2001 WL 221622, at *3 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar.
5, 2001). Meanwhile, the First, Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly declined to rule on
this issue. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v.
Matthews, 168 F.3d 1234, 1242 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 883,981, 989 (1999); United States
v. McCleary, 112 F.3d 511, 1997 WL 215525, at *5 (4th Cir. !997) (unpublished table decision);
Autullo v. United States, 81 F.3d 163, 1996 WL 149346, at *5 (7th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision); United States v. Claudio, 44 F.3d 10, 15 (1st Cir. 1995).
19. See infra Part I.
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scholars have given Brady's application in the plea bargaining context any
attention at all. 20
In the analysis below, I argue that Brady's role in protecting the innocent
from Wrongful conviction is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as
it is at trial, and that therefore even defendants who plead guilty should be
entitled to Brady's protections. Still, I ultimately conclude that Brady's
application in the plea bargaining context is destined to provide only a
shadow of the protection Brady provides at trial because of the materiality
standard currently used to judge post-plea Brady claims. In making both
points, I employ a model of the plea bargaining defendant's decision-making
process, using modern choice theory to demonstrate Brady's effect on the
accuracy of convictions based on a guilty plea. Throughout the discussion, I
consider guilty pleas and convictions to be accurate so long as they are
supported by s.ome measure of factually guilty conduct.21
Part I of this Article examines the judicial approaches currently used to
extend Brady rights to defendants who plead guilty, concluding that the
strongest doctrinal justification for applying Brady in the plea bargaining
context looks to Brady's effect on the accuracy of a plea. Part II examines
Brady's effect on the accuracy of guilty pleas, concluding that the disclosure
of material, favorable information is necessary to prevent innocent
defendants from falsely pleading guilty. Part III turns to Brady's materiality
standard in the plea bargaining context, arguing that the showing currently
required for post-plea Brady claims fails to realize Brady's accuracyenhancing potential. Part IV concludes the analysis, underscoring the

20. This point was made in 1989, see McMunigal, supra note 16, at 958 (observing that more
scholars have recognized the issue than analyzed it), and still holds true today. See Douglass, supra
note 14, at 441 (noting that "[s]cholars have devoted surprisingly little attention to the issue"). Even
those who address Brady's application to the guilty plea defendant have often done so while making a
related, but different, analytic point. See, e.g., McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 933 n.l73 (advocating
broad pre-plea discovery to minimize unconstitutional conditions inherent in plea bargaining); Eleanor
J. Ostrow, Comment, The Case for Prep/ea Disclosure, 90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1606-17 (1981)
(advocating broad pre-plea discovery to maximize the consensual nature of plea bargaining
transactions).
21. While recognizing that guilt is more often a shade of gray than black or white, I treat
defendants as either entirely guilty or entirely innocent to draw the most pointed conclusions regarding
Brady's effect in the plea bargaining context. After all, the very essence of plea bargaining is
compromise, so we should not expect plea bargains to be accurate in the sense of matching the
particular level of a defendant's factual culpability. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1909 (noting
that plea bargains differ from results at trial in that the sentences imposed upon defendants who plead
guilty are lower, while the conviction rate for those who bargain is 100%); Ostrow, supra note 20, at
1600 (noting that the offense to which a defendant pleads guilty is commonly different from the
offense committed because plea bargaining is concerned with the consequences of a plea rather than
the factual basis for it). One could, however, relax my starting assumptions and apply the same
analysis, with similar, though diluted, results.

6

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL.

80:1

importance of protecting innocent defendants who plea bargain as well as
those who contest their guilt at trial.
I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: SQUARE PEGS IN A ROUND HOLE

As mentioned above, state and federal courts across the country are
divided as to whether defendants who plead guilty can claim Brady's
protections. 22 One circuit, in fact, has contradicted itself and answered the
question both ways? 3 Though most courts do allow guilty plea defendants to
attack their plea by establishing a Brady violation, 24 there is little agreement
as to how to doctrinally justify that result. 25 Why should defendants who
plead guilty be allowed to make Brady claims when a guilty plea forfeits
almost every other trial right? 26 In the analysis below, I conclude that an
interest in factually accurate pleas might justify that result, but only after
identifying serious doctrinal and logical flaws in the judicial approaches
currently used to justify post-guilty plea Brady claims.
Before proceeding, however, a preliminary concession is in order. Even
in the substantial minority of jurisdictions refusing to recognize post-guilty
plea Brady claims, 27 defendants who plea bargain may still receive Brady
information. After all, until defendants actually enter a guilty plea, they could
always go to triaf 8-and the very possibility of going to trial may mandate

22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
23. Compare White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 422-24 (8th Cir. 1988) (considering a guilty
plea defendant's Brady claim on the merits), with Smith v. United States, 876 F.2d 655, 657 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 869 (1989) (holding that a guilty plea waives a defendant's Brady claim). New
York is internally split as well. Compare People v. Day, 541 N.Y.S.2d 463,467 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989)
(holding that a guilty plea waives issues of factual guilt, including a Brady claim), with People v.
Burney, 642 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that whether a Brady violation warrants
setting aside guilty plea is determined by a multi-factored test), and People v. Armer, 501 N.Y.S.2d
203,205-06 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (holding that a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea once a Brady
violation is established).
24. See infra Part I.A-C.
25. See infra Part I.A-C.
26. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (holding that a guilty plea
defendant is barred from challenging an indictment by a grand jury that systematically excluded
blacks, even though the defendant was unaware of the constitutional violation at the time of his plea);
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771-74 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea defendant is barred
from raising a Fifth Amendment challenge to the voluntariness of his confession, despite
constitutionally deficient state procedure for challenging confession at trial). See also Tollett, 411 U.S.
at 267 ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the
offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the
deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.").
27. See supra note 18.
28. Indeed, it is not unheard of for defendants to profess their desire to contest guilt at trial, only
to change their mind at the last minute and enter a guilty plea instead. See, e.g., Sieling v. Eyman, 478
F.2d 211, 213 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Wagner, 752 P.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Or. 1988), vacated by 492
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some pretrial disclosures. 29 Moreover, prosecutors taking the "high road"
may decide to share Brady information with plea bargaining defendants even
without a legal or ethical obligation to do so. 30 The question, then, is not
whether defendants who plea bargain will get Brady information; rather, the
question is whether defendants who plea bargain have a remedy if they do
not. Given that focus, the discussion below examines only those judicial
approaches that provide a remedy in some form or fashion for established
post-guilty plea Brady claims.
A. Courts Holding That Brady Claims Negate the Voluntary and
Intelligent Nature of a Guilty Plea

Most courts willing to recognize Brady's application in the plea
bargaining context conclude that an established Brady violation negates the
voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea, rendering the plea invalid. 31

u.s. 912 (1989).
29. Because Brady information must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial, the need for
pre-trial disclosure will necessarily vary with the type of Brady information at issue. LAFAVE ET AL.,
supra note 5, § 24.3(b), at 1105. Thus, for example, investigative leads on an alibi witness would
require disclosure well before trial, but a witness's inconsistent statements could remain undisclosed
until after trial has begun. In the latter example, a prosecutor's obligation under Brady and the Jencks
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (2000), which requires federal prosecutors to disclose witness's prior
recorded statements after they testify, would merge. See id. § 24.3(c), at 1107 (discussing the possible
overlap of Brady and Jencks Act obligations).
30. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 457-6~ (discussing a prosecutor's incentives to disclose
Brady information voluntarily during plea bargaining but ultimately finding those incentives
inadequate). See also McMunigal, supra note 16, at 1024-27 (discussing the ambiguity in ethics rules
over disclosure of Brady material in the plea negotiation process and the failure of formal discovery
rules to protect guilty plea defendants or assure complete Brady disclosure). But see In re Grant, 541
S.E.2d 540, 540 (S.C. 2001) (imposing disciplinary sanction on a prosecutor for not disclosing Brady
information to a defendant before he pleaded guilty). To the extent ethical and legal compulsion to
disclose Brady information to plea bargaining defendants is absent, any such disclosure becomes
subject to the vagaries of prosecutors' individualized trial practice. See Uviller, supra note 2, at 113-14
(describing informal discovery as capricious because it varies with local tradition, individual
prosecutor's attitudes, personal relationships with defense attorneys, and the tactical advantage of
sharing certain information).
31. A guilty plea must be voluntary because it is a confession of factual guilt protected by the
Fifth Amendment, and it must be intelligent because it represents a waiver of trial rights. Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242-43 (1969). Though the Supreme Court has over time distanced itself from
the waiver analogy, see United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573 (1989); Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258 (1973), it has continued to adhere to the requirement that a plea be intelligent as well as
voluntary. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (1998). The Court has, however,
increasingly used the voluntariness requirement to address circumstances previously considered
relevant to whether a plea was entered in an intelligent manner. Compare Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 U.S. 742, 756 (1970) (holding that the defendant's plea was intelligently made because he
received notice of the nature of the charge against him and had competent counsel to advise him), with
United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1989) (noting that competent counsel and notice of the
nature of the charge are required for a voluntary plea); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 436
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Still, courts taking this position differ as to how they reach that result. Some
courts hold that Brady claims are sufficient per se to negate the voluntary and
intelligent nature of a plea,32 while others consider a Brady violation to be
just one of a number of circumstances relevant in determining whether a plea
is voluntary and intelligent. 33 Still others treat Brady claims as a type of
governmental misrepresentation that either negates the voluntary and
intelligent nature of a plea or renders the plea invalid despite its voluntary
and intelligent nature. 34 As discussed below, each approach has its own
appeal-and its own pitfalls as well.

1. The Per Se Approach
A number of jurisdictions, most notably the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, have ruled that Brady violations are sufficient per se to negate
the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty plea, automatically rendering
the plea invalid. 35 Most attractive about the per se approach is its common
sense recognition that guilty plea decisions made without information
absolving a defendant (or at least reducing the penalty of a conviction) are
not truly voluntary and intelligent-at least under any ordinary understanding
of those terms. 36 In addition, the per se approach to post-guilty plea Brady
claims is attractive because it avoids the moral hazard problem that limiting

(1983) (stating that notice of the nature of the charge is essential to a voluntary plea), and Henderson
v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 & n.13 (1976) (noting that a plea may be involuntary because the
defendant failed to receive notice of the charge).
32. See infra Part I.A. I.
33. See infra Part I.A.2.
34. See infra Part I.A.3.
35. See, e.g., Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1453-54 (9th Cir. 1995); People v. Carter,
687 N.Y.S.2d 12, IS (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 324 (S.C. 1999); Ex
parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 700-01 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). See also supra note 14 (noting the
Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S.
Ct. 803 (2002) (mem.)). Interestingly, at least one jurisdiction uses the per se approach only when a
prosecutor willfully suppresses Brady information. See Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978). This qualification, however, appears to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
disregard for a prosecutor's moral culpability in suppressing Brady evidence at trial. See text
accompanying supra note II. See also Larry Kupers & John T. Philipsbom, Mephistophelian Deals:
The Newest in Standard Plea Agreements, CHAMPION, Aug. 1999, at 18, 64 (distinguishing the Ninth
Circuit's per se approach from approaches used by other circuits).
36. The term "voluntary" generally means intentional, deliberate, and willful. See THE
AMERJCAN HERJTAGE DICTIONARY 1355 (2d ed. 1991). The term "intelligent" generally means
knowing or rational. See id. at 668. Given these definitions, a guilty plea could hardly be characterized
as either voluntary or intelligent when it rests upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the
circumstances surrounding the decision to plead guilty.
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Brady to the trial context creates, negating any incentive prosecutors might
otherwise have to withhold Brady information in hopes of eliciting a plea. 37
Unfortunately, the per se approach is also beset with problems, most
notably its dissonance with the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence.
Under current Supreme Court precedent, a voluntary and intelligent guilty
plea requires defendants to know only the charges against them and the
consequences of pleading guilty, enabling even seriously uninformed guilty
pleas to pass constitutional muster. 38 Indeed, the Court has specifically
rejected the notion that a defendant is entitled to an accurate assessment of
the government's case in order to enter a valid plea, reasoning instead that
uncertainty is an inevitable part of the plea bargaining process. 39 Thus, while
common sense may tell us that a defendant needs Brady information to enter
a voluntary and intelligent plea, the Supreme Court's indications are clearly
to the contrary.
Equally troubling, the per se approach appears to prove too much. If a
valid guilty plea requires a truly informed choice, then it stands to reason that
defendants are entitled to information in the government's files that is both
for and against them. After all, a defendant will not know the strength of a
prosecutor's case without both types of information, and the strength of the
prosecutor's case is what a defendant most needs to know in order to engage
in some semblance of informed decision-making about a plea.40 Still, it is
well settled that prosecutors have no obligation to disclose inculpatory
evidence to defendants as a prelude to a bargain or a trial. 41 Thus, the per se

37. See Sanchez, 50 F.3d at 1453.
38. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749-55 (1970). Moreoever, so long as defendants have competent
counsel, the voluntary and intelligent nature of their pleas will be presumed. See id. at 757-58.
39. See id. at 756-57 ("[Plea bargaining considerations] frequently present imponderable
questions for which there are no certain answers .... A defendant is not entitled to withdraw his plea
merely because he discovers long after the plea has been accepted that his calculus misapprehended
the quality of the State's case or the likely penalties attached to alternative courses of action."). See
also Douglass, supra note 14, at 463-69 (recognizing that the Supreme Court's standards for a
voluntary and intelligent guilty plea present formidable barriers to the application of Brady in the plea
bargaining context).
40. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1583 (arguing that a defendant must be able to assess his
chances of acquittal in order to meaningfully consent to a plea bargain); infra Part II. A.
41. At least one defendant has made the argument, though unsuccessfully. See United States v.
Kidding, 560 F.2d 1303, 1313 (7th Cir. 1977) (rejecting defendant's claim that had the government
disclosed inculpatory evidence before trial, he would have pleaded guilty to a bargain). See also
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 & n.20 (rejecting materiality standard that would focus on
defendant's ability to prepare for trial because it would necessarily encompass both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence); Douglass, supra note 14, at 468 (recognizing that the right to a fully informed
plea would encompass information that is not even available to defendants who choose trial).
Attempting to sidestep such logical difficulties, a few courts have held that a valid guilty plea
requires only the information that a defendant is legally entitled to. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d
131, 133 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) ("The question for determination here is whether Lee [made] a knowing,
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approach's rationale would support a duty to disclose more expansive than
even Brady's proponents are willing to recognize. Given such fundamental
doctrinal and logical difficulties, the per se approach falls far short of the
persuasive justification necessary for recognizing Brady in the plea
bargaining context.

2. The Totality-ofthe-Circumstances Approach
Several jurisdictions, including the Courts of Appeals for the Sixth and
42
Eighth Circuits, likewise recognize that a Brady claim can negate the
voluntary and intelligentnature of a· guilty plea, but consider the totality of
the circumstances in arriving at that result. 43 Courts taking this approach
view a Brady violation as just one of a number of relevant factors in
determining whether a plea is voluntary and intelligent, focusing as much on
the facts underlying a Brady claim as they do on the claim itself. 44 Indeed,
under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, a post-guilty plea Brady

intelligent choice under circumstances where he was deprived of information to which by law he was
entitled."); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y. County 1994) ("It is one thing for
defendant and counsel to miscalculate the nature and persuasiveness of the prosecution's case. It is
another for defendant and counsel to act without the benefit of information which is required to have
been disclosed."). This solution, however, is equally problematic, for it assumes that a plea bargaining
defendant is entitled to Brady information in the first place.
42. But see supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that the Eighth Circuit has contradicted
itself and decided the Brady issue both ways).
43. See, e.g., White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1988); Campbell v.
Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); People v. Burney, 642 N.Y.S.2d 990 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996).
Interestingly, the court in State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994), used a totalityof-the-circumstances approach in considering a defendant's Brady claim as part of a motion to
withdraw his plea. See id. at 1148, 1150-53. In Gardner, however, the court held that a Brady violation
would not be sufficient grounds to withdraw the plea if the information withheld pertained to a fact the
defendant had admitted in open court when he pleaded guilty. See id. at 1151. The approach used in
Gardner appears to be particularly problematic, for by the time a defendant formally enters a plea, that
defendant has every reason to say whatever it takes to get a judge to accept the bargain. See Scott &
Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1912 (describing plea hearings as "rigged to support the deal that the two
attorneys have already struck"); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1601 (recognizing a defendant's strong
incentive to lie to a judge so that a plea bargain will be accepted); Lee Sheppard, Comment, Disclosure
to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J. CRJM. L. &
CRJMINOLOGY 165, 165-66 (1981) (noting that by the time a plea is formally entered, the interests of
the defendant and the prosecutor are no longer adverse because both· want to ensure the success of the
bargain).
44. Factors considered by the Sixth Circuit include the factual basis for the plea (focusing on the
defendant's in-court admission of guilt), the presence of proper plea-taking procedures, the assistance
of competent counsel, the nature of the misconduct at issue compared to the misconduct at issue in the
Brady trilogy, and likelihood that a constitutional violation had occurred. See Campbell, 769 F.2d at
321-22. The Eighth Circuit's totality-of-the-circumstances analysis uses a similar approach, though it
has considered at least one additional factor. See White, 858 F.2d at 424 (considering the benefit
received by the defendant in pleading guilty). For a criticism of the Eighth Circuit's approach in
considering a defendant's benefit from pleading guilty, see infra note 179.
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claim-at least as a constitutional violation-need not be established at all. 45
Thus, even if defendants technically forfeit their Brady rights upon entering a
guilty plea, courts adopting this approach will still consider the fact that the
government suppressed favorable information when determining whether the
defendant entered a voluntary and intelligent plea.
The main attraction of the totality-of-the-circumstances approach is its
ability to provide guilty plea defendants with relieffor Brady violations, even
if the Supreme Court's guilty plea jurisprudence renders those violations not
46
constitutionally cognizable. Like the per se approach, however, the totalityof-the-circumstances approach is plagued by the fact that under the Court's
guilty plea decisions, a Brady violation· ·is . unlikely, to have any effect
whatsoever on the voluntary and intelligent nature of a defendant's guilty
plea. 47 Moreover, the totality-of-the-circumstances approach appears to be
counterintuitive in recognizing the importance of information to a voluntary
and intelligent plea while denying that a Brady violation is itself sufficient to
render a plea invalid. Either a voluntary and intelligent plea requires
informed decision-making, in which case Brady violations should be
sufficient by themselves to render a plea invalid-or it does not, in which
case Brady violations should have absolutely no effect on the validity of a
plea.48 Both positions are easier to justify than the potential anomaly
resulting under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, where one
established Brady violation may invalidate a plea while another may not. 49

45. The Sixth Circuit has gone so far as to question whether post-plea Brady violations as
cognizable constitutional violations actually exist, noting that "ihere is no authority within our
knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due
process." Campbell, 769 F.2d at 322 (emphasis omitted). To say that a defendant need not establish a
constitutional violation under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach, however, is not to say that
the constitutional status of a post-guilty plea Brady claim is entirely irrelevant. To the contrary, it is
one of the factors considered in determining the voluntary and intelligent nature of a defendant's plea.
See supra note 44.
46. The totality-of-the-circumstances approach also follows the Supreme Court's admonition that
when 'considering a challenge to a guilty plea, courts must ask whether the plea was voluntary and
intelligent, not whether a constitutional violation has occurred. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 749 (1970).
47. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
48. In short, if we afford Brady rights to the guilty plea defendant, those rights should, like Brady
rights at trial, be sufficient to upset a conviction-especially considering the fact that even the most
competent counsel cannot compensate for suppressed favorable information. See infra note 133.
49. Exemplifying this anomaly, the Sixth Circuit in Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir.
1985), held that the defendant's plea was voluntary and intelligent, while assuming that the facts
presented would have established a valid Brady claim had the defendant taken his case to trial. See id.
at 318.
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It would appear, then, that the strength of the totality-of-thecircumstances approach is also its weakness-the back-door treatment of
Brady claims. 50 By treating Brady claims as more of a factual circumstance
than an alleged constitutional violation, courts using this approach essentially
strip Brady of its due process stature, rendering its protections on par with
statutory mandates such as the factual basis requirement. 51 As a result, the
totality-of-the-circumstances approach may be more flexible than the per se
approach, but the distinction makes no meaningful difference-neither
approach provides a viable justification for recognizing post-guilty plea
Brady claims.

3. The Misrepresentation Approach
. The third, and final, approach that courts use in holding that a Brady
violation negates the voluntary and intelligent nature of a guilty ph~a treats
suppressed Brady information as official misrepresentation or misconduct. 52
Under the Second Circuit's version of this approach, government
misrepresentation provides a reason to invalidate a plea, even if the plea was
voluntary and intelligent. 53 Under the Tenth Circuit's version, by contrast,

50. Indeed, many of the same factors considered under the totality-of-the-circumstances
approach would be considered if a post-plea Brady claim were formally recognized because they are
also relevant in determining whether the suppression of favorable evidence is material. See State v.
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (S.C. 1994) (recognizing that inquiry into the effect of a Brady violation
on a defendant's plea decision is essentially the same as assessing the materiality of the suppressed
evidence). For a discussion of Brady's materiality standard in the plea bargaining context, see infra
Part III.
51. See supra note 44. Of course, if the Sixth Circuit is correct in surmising that post-plea Brady
claims do not exist in the first place, see Campbell, 769 F.2d at 322, then the totality-of-thecircumstances approach gives guilty plea defendants more protection than they would have under an
.
analysis considering Brady claims qua constitutional claims.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 43 F.3d 491, 499 (lOth Cir. 1994); Miller v. Angliker, 848
F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988); People v. Benard, 620 N.Y.S.2d 242, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1994)
(explicitly following Miller v. Angliker). Even courts using other approaches to post-plea Brady claims
have characterized those claims as alleging misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct. See,
e.g., Campbell, 769 F.2d at 321 (considering a Brady claim in the larger class of "misconduct of
constitutional proportions"); Gardner, 885 P.2d at I ISO (referring to a Brady claim as an allegation of
"misconduct by the state"); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 326 (S.C. 1999) (describing a Brady
violation as a type of prosecutorial misconduct). Commentators have made the analogy as well. See,
e.g., Barbara Gamer & John Petty, A Plea for Openness in Plea Bargaining, 16 GONZ. L. REv. 81, 94
(1980) (arguing that failing to disclose Brady information in plea bargaining equates to
misrepresentation); Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 1004, 1007-12 (1986) (treating Brady violations as a form ofprosecutorial misconduct under
the Supreme Court's guilty plea decisions).
53. See United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 255 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[W]here prosecutors have
withheld favorable material evidence even a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be
vulnerable to challenge.") (quoting Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320); Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320 ("[W]e
conclude that even a guilty plea that was 'knowing' and 'intelligent' may be vulnerable to challenge if
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government misrepresentation provides a reason to invalidate a plea because
it renders the plea no longer voluntary and intelligent. 54 In short, under the
Tenth Circuit's version of the misrepresentation approach, Brady violations
are an example of (rather than an exception to) the rule that only voluntary
and intelligent pleas are valid.
As a doctrinal matter, the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases suggest that
government misrepresentation does in fact negate the voluntary and
intelligent nature of a plea, supporting the Tenth Circuit's version of the
misrepresentation approach. 55 However, both versions of this approach are
unassailable under the Supreme Court's guilty plea decisions to the extent
they hold that pleas based on official misrepresentation are invalid. 56
Furthermore, both versions of the misrepresentation approach avoid the
defmitional problems that arise when assessing Brady claims under the
otherwise lax standards for a voluntary and intelligent plea. 57 Equally
appealing, the misrepresentation approach is imiquely compatible with the
Supreme Court's view that Brady violations at trial constitute prosecutorial
misconduct because they breach a prosecutor's duty to do justice. 58
Nevertheless, even the misrepresentation approach to post-guilty plea
Brady claims is not without its· share of doctrinal difficulties, for it has
defmitional problems of its own. To justify post-plea Brady claims under the
misrepresentation approach, a court must find that nondisclosure of Brady
information before a defendant pleads guilty equates to misrepresentation. To
make that finding, however, a court must determine that guilty plea
defendants are entitled to Brady information in the first place. After all, a
prosecutor's silence with regards to favorable information can only constitute
misrepresentation ifthe prosecutor has a duty to disclose it. 59 Admittedly, the

it was entered without knowledge of material evidence withheld by the prosecution.").
54. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 495 (reasoning that a guilty plea does not prevent defendants from
claiming that their plea resulted from prosecutorial misrepresentation because "( s]uch claims directly
challenge the voluntary and intelligent nature of the plea").
55. For example, in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), the Supreme Court defined a
voluntary plea in part by what it was not, explicitly excluding from its definition those pleas induced
by threats, misrepresentation, and improper promises. /d. at 755. See also id. at 757 (recognizing
"misrepresentation or other impermissible conduct by state agents" as a basis for invalidating a plea).
56. See id.; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275,286 (1941) ("(I]f[the defendant] was deceived or
coerced by the prosecutor into entering a guilty plea, ·he was deprived of a constitutional right.")
(footnote omitted). What constitutes deception, however, remains to be determined. See infra text
accompanying notes 59-62.
57. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
58. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,219 (1982) (referring to "prosecutorial misconduct" and
citing Brady); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 88 (1963) (stating that suppressing evidence favorable
to the accused "casts the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport
with standards of justice").
59. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(d) (1981). Neither the Second nor the
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misrepresentation analogy is more persuasive where a defendant requests
Brady information and the prosecutor lies, saying there is none-or where a
prosecutor provides only some information, concealing the rest. In the end,
however, mere silence regarding favorable information (what Brady
proscribes)60 cannot equate to misrepresentation absent an obligation to share
it. 61 That being the case, the misrepresentation approach is impossible to
employ without at some point assuming the very duty to disclose it seeks to
establish. 62
It is tempting to interpret the misrepresentation approach broadly in an
effort to elude its circular reasoning. One could, for example, .argue that the
Supreme Court's refusal to uphold pleas based on misrepresentation reflects
a defendant's larger due process right to fair treatment in plea bargaining.
Supporting this view, a number of commentators have argued that Brady
disclosure is essential to fair plea bargaining,63 and the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of fairness in the plea bargaining context as a
whole. 64 Unfortunately, however, the Court's recognition of fairness as a due
process bargaining constraint has meant only that the prosecution must keep
any plea bargaining promises made-and even then, its failure to do so will
only constitute a due process violation when defendants rely on the broken
promise to their detriment. 65 In that instance, however, the Court is
essentially just enforcing a defendant's right to know the consequences
attending a plea,66 and there is a palpable difference between defendants who

Tenth Circuits appear to have recognized this difficulty; both simply assume that Brady violations
equate to misrepresentation. See Wright, 43 F.3d at 495-96; Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320.
60. See supra note I 0 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
62. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 59 (recognizing the potential for a misrepresentation-based
analysis to be "question-begging").
63. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 14, at 2083 (arguing that Brady disclosure is an essential
component of fundamentally fair plea bargaining process); Sheppard, supra note 43, at 166
(maintaining that unfairness in plea bargaining results in part from a defendant's inability to obtain
pertinent information); Gamer & Petty, supra note 52, at 82-83 (contending that notions of fair play
require disclosure of Brady information in plea bargaining); Note, supra note 52, at 1019 (contending
that fundamental notions of fairness necessitate disclosure of Brady information in the plea bargaining
context).
64. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) (stating that tlie benefits of plea
bargaining "presuppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor").
65. In Santobel/o v. New York, the Supreme Court held that due process required the state to keep
its plea bargaining promises, see 404 U.S. at 262, but in Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984), the
Court limited the rule set forth in Santobello to only those instances where the· defendant entered a
guilty plea in reliance on the promises. See id. at 510. Thus, in Mabry, the defendant's due process
claim failed because the state had withdrawn the plea offer at issue before the defendant entered his
plea. !d.
66. According to the Court in Mabry, Santobel/o was based on the notion that when prosecutors
do not perform their end of the bargain, defendants' guilty pleas rest on false premises. !d. at 509. In
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were deceived as to the true consequences of their pleas (because prosecutors
failed to keep their promises) and defendants who knew the consequences of
their pleas, but would not have preferred those consequences with better
information.
Ironically, even the Supreme Court's characterization of Brady violations
as prosecutorial misconduct is of limited help;67 in the negotiation context,
unlike at trial, hiding the weaknesses in one's case is considered an accepted
convention. 68 Thus, even if due process requires fair bargaining, fair
bargaining may not require Brady disclosure. Establishing just what fair
bargaining does require, however, returns us to the same problem that
burdens the more narrow interpretation of the misrepresentation approach. If
due process requires fair bargaining, we still have to defme what is fair, and
Brady violations are only unfair if we say they are. Thus, neither version of
the misrepresentation approach is free of question-begging difficulties,
though those difficulties are perhaps less bothersome than those
accompanying the per se and totality-of-the-circumstances approaches. 69

the end; then, the Court's fair bargaining mandates are reduced to mere knowledge of the charge and
the consequences of pleading guilty. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
68. See Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Disclosing Exculpatory Material in Plea
Negotiations, 16 CRIM.JUST. 41,42 (2001) ("Although affirmative misrepresentation is generally seen
as unethical, nondisclosure appears to be an accepted convention for negotiators."). See also Mabry,
467 U.S. at 511 (noting that in plea bargaining, the due process clause is not a code of ethics for
prosecutors); supra note 30 (noting ambiguity in ethics rules regarding a prosecutor's duty to disclose
Brady information during plea bargaining). Although t~e Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
Brady's concern for prosecutorial ethics, see Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (discussing
special duty of prosecutor to do justice); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (same); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110 (1976) (same), the fact that even willful suppression of favorable
evidence will not necessarily. establish a Brady violation suggests that reliance on ethical
considerations alone to establish Brady's application in the plea bargaining context would be
misplaced. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437-38. (even deliberate suppression of evidence will not amount to
a Brady violation unless the evidence is material, but suppression of favorable evidence that is material
will always amount to a Brady violation even if not deliberate); Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110 (same). See
also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220 n.IO (1982) (even in the most egregious cases of willful
prosecutorial misconduct, a new trial is appropriate only when trial outcome is affected).
69. One could make the same criticism about Brady violations at trial constituting misconduct.
Moreover, determining whether a Brady violation equates to misrepresentation in the plea bargaining
context is arguably question-begging either way. See People v. Martin, 669 N.Y.S.2d 268, 276 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (Rosenberger, J., dissenting) ("To say that the plea prevents examination of its own
validity is .illogical."). To the extent that the question-begging difficulty is an inevitable aspect of
interpreting the Supreme Court's misrepresentation language, the importance of assessing the viability
of post-guilty plea Brady claims using independent criteria, such as accuracy interests, becomes even
more apparent.

16

WASHINGTON UNNERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

(VOL.

80:1

B. Courts Holding That Brady Claims Establish Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel
As if to show just how varied judicial treatment of Brady in the plea
bargaining context can be, a few courts willing to consider post-guilty plea
Brady claims on the merits hold that such claims, if valid, establish a Sixth
Amendment violation for ineffective assistance of counsel (and hence the
invalidity of a plea). 70 Most attractive about the Sixth Amendment approach
is its appreciation of the fact that defense attorneys need Brady information
in order to effectively counsel their clients about the type of plea they should
enter. 71
Even so, the basic premise of the Sixth Amendment approach to postguilty plea Brady claims .is that "an attorney may render ineffective
assistance through no fault of his own,"72 and that premise fundamentally
misconstrues the Supreme Court's definition of ineffective assistance of
counsel. Under the Court's Sixth Amendment cases, an attorney's
performance is only ineffective when it is grossly inappropriate under the
circumstances, falling outside a wide range of professionally competent
conduct. 73 Hence, by definition, it is impossible for an attorney to be
constitutionally ineffective without also being at fault. When it comes to
Brady violations, however, a defense attorney's fault is never at issue; the
duty to disclose belongs to prosecutors alone, regardless of what defense
attorneys do or fail to do. 74 Thus, Brady violations may in practice have a

70. See, e.g., State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797,801-02 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); Zacek v. Brewer, 241
N.W.2d 41, 50-52 (Iowa 1976). See also Blank, supra note 14, at 2084 (arguing that a Brady violation
precludes defense counsel from rendering constitutionally effective assistance); Gamer & Petty, supra
note 52, at 91-92 (maintaining tha:t effective assistance of counsel is only possible where an attorney
can assess the risks of trial for his client).
71. See, e.g., Zacek, 241 N.W.2d at 51-52 (noting that effective assistance of counsel requires
defense attorneys to properly evaluate facts). See also Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131, 134 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) ("[T]he defense cannot recommend a plea of guilty or discuss a plea of guilty with .a
defendant unless they are aware of factors which might mitigate the case against their clients.")
(internal quotations omitted). Even the Supreme Court has recognized the link between post-plea
Brady claims and post-plea ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,
59 (1985) (recognizing "failure to investigate or discover potentially exculpatory evidence" as an
example of ineffective assistance of counsel that could result in an invalid plea). See also supra note
70.
.
72. Zacek, 241 N.W.2d at 51.
73. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984) (determining that the
performance prong of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and
outside a wide range of competence).
74. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. If, however, a guilty plea defendant's Brady rights
are waivable, see supra note 15, legal advice concerning such a waiver could conceivably provide the
basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
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deleterious effect on the quality of an attorney's advice, but that effect lacks
any constitutional significance whatsoever. 75
Considering Brady violations under the rubric of an ineffective assistance
of counsel analysis is problematic for two other reasons as well. First, the
Sixth Amendment approach assumes that defense attorneys require a certain
amount of information to adequately advise their clients, leaving it
vulnerable to all the logical and doctrinal problems that burden the other
approaches based on informed decision-making discussed above. 76 Second,
the Sixth Amendment approach is circuitous, distracting our attention from
what a Brady violation is really about-the performance of a prosecutor, not
a defense attomey. 77 In light of all these considerations, the Sixth
Amendment approach to post-plea Brady claims is a particularly
unsatisfactory way to justify Brady's application in the plea bargaining
context. 78

C. Courts Considering Brady Claims Under a Motion to Withdraw a
Defendant's Guilty Plea
As a final doctrinal avenue for extending Brady's protections to the plea
bargaining defendant, it is worth noting that a number of state and federal
courts consider Brady claims as part of a defendant's motion to withdraw a
guilty plea. 79 Courts examining Brady claims in this context rely on statutory,

75. To their credit, courts using a Sixth Amendment· approach are at least acting in accordance
with the Supreme Court's admonition in Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973). In Tollett, the
Court held that a defendant may attack the voluntary and intelligent nature of his plea only by showing
that the advice he received from counsel was constitutionally deficient. See id. at 267. However, a
literal reading of Tollett's language is clearly inappropriate. Although competent counsel may afford
guilty pleas a presumption of being voluntary and intelligent, see supra note 38, no one would argue
that a defendant coerced into pleading guilty is precluded from challenging the voluntariness of that
plea just because he had admittedly competent counsel. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55 ("A guilty
plea entered at gunpoint is no less involuntary because an attorney is present to explain how the gun
works.").
76. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
77. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at 187-89 (recognizing circuitous nature of ineffective
assistance of counsel approach to post-guilty plea Brady claims).
·
78. The fact that Brady violations do not also constitute Sixth Amendment violations makes
independent recognition of Brady rights in the plea bargaining context even more important. After all,
if a defense attorney's failure to discover favorable evidence is sufficient to invalidate a defendant's
guilty plea, see supra note 71, why should the result be any different when the government hides the
exact same information? In the first case, our problem with the plea is that it is' unreliable, see supra
note 6, but that problem does not suddenly disappear because the party responsible for it has changed.
79. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 815-18 (3d Cir. 2001); Carroll v. State, 474
S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797, 799-803 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987); State
v. Johnson, 544 So.2d 767 (La. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2001); State v. Davis, 823 S.W.2d 217 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991); State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d
589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999); Jefferson v. Commonwealth, 500 S.E.2d 219 (Va. Ct. App. 1998).
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rather than constitutional, authority to set aside a defendant's conviction,
though constitutional considerations are sometimes given · statutory
significance as well. 80 Although the precise standard for considering postplea Brady claims in this fashion varies across jurisdictions, courts using a
statutory approach usually ask whether a defendant's Brady claim provides a
"fair and just reason" to withdraw a. plea if the motion is made before
sentencing,81 and whether denying the motion would result in "manifest
injustice" if the motion to withdraw the plea is made after sentencing. 82
Because motions to withdraw a guilty plea are typically left to a trial court's
sound discretion, the s.tandard for reviewing Brady claims considered under a
statutory approach is highly defe~ential. 83 ·
Courts considering 'post~ guilty plea Brady claims as part of a defendant's
motion to withdraw a guilty plea have little choice but· to examine those
clai~s in light of the statUtory context in which they were brought. 84 Still, a
court's discretionary power to allow defendants to withdraw their plea based
on a Brady violation is hardly the type of gliaranteed protection on which a
plea bargaining defendant can rely. 85 Moreover, because courts typically

Naturally, courts can consider post-guilty plea Brady claims as part of a defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea regardless of their position on the viability of those claims as constitutional
violations. See United States v. Lampaziane, 251 F.3d 519, 523-25 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that
alleged Brady violation is nonjurisdictional challenge waived by guilty plea, but considering facts of
claim anyway to decide defendant's motion to withdraw his plea); United States v. Millan-Colon, 829
F. Supp. 620, 634-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (recognizing the misrepresentation approach but considering a
post-plea Brady claim under defendant's motion to withdraw his plea); United States v. Ayala, 690 F.
Supp. 1014, 1016-17 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (same).
80. Some courts, in fact, hold. that where a constitutional violation is established, defendants are
automatically entitled to withdraw their pleas. See, e.g., Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d at 593; State v.
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
81. Rule 32(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant may
withdraw his plea with the court's permission. FED. R. CRJM. P. 32(e). Rule 32(e) further provides that
a defendant's motion to withdraw made prior to sentencing will be granted upon a showing of a fair
and just reason. !d. See also Aram A Schvey & Katherine Gates, Twenty-Ninth Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure: Guilty Pleas, 88 GEO. L.J. 1228, 1257-59 (2000) (discussing Rule 32(e)
requirements).
82. See, e.g., Carroll, 474 S.E.2d at 740 (rioting that withdrawal of plea is appropriate only to
correct manifest injustice); Simons, 731 P.2d at 799 (stating that the withdrawal of a guilty plea after
sentencing is proper only to correct manifest injustice); Jefferson, 500 S.E.2d at 223 (same).
83. See, e.g., Carroll, 474 S.E.2d at 740 (reviewing the trial court's refusal to grant a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard); Simons, 731 P.2d at 803 (same);
Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d at 593 (sarne).
84. But see United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 261-62 (2d Cir. 1998) (determining that if a
Brady violation is established, statutory framework allowing trial courts the discretion to deny a
defendant's motion to withdraw is inappropriate).
85. Because this approach relies on statutory authority to provide a guilty plea defendant relief
for a Brady violation, the protection afforded is (at least in theory) subject to the whim of state and
federal legislatures. Moreover, the discretion afforded to judges under this approach means that even
established Brady violations may not result in the withdrawal of a defendant's plea. Of course, in
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consider prejudice to the government in exerclSlng their discretion on
motions to withdraw a plea, the statutory approach to post-plea Brady claims
could lead to unfair results, . holding against the defendant what the
government brought upon itself. 86 Thus, while the statutory approach to postplea Brady claims may avoid the pitfalls of a constitutional analysis, it is still
the least attractive option for guaranteeing Brady protections to the plea
bargaining defendant.
D. Another Way?

Given the above discussion, "rione of the judicial approaches currently
used to justify post-plea Brady claims seem particularly satisfactory. This
recognition, in fact, is one reason a substantial minority of courts have
concluded that Brady claims do not survive a plea. 87 Still, the Supreme
Court's guilty plea cases appear to provide another, thus far overlooked,
possible basis for recognizing post-plea Brady claims-Brady's affect on the
accuracy of convictions based on a guilty plea. 88 Without a doubt, the
Supreme Court's guilty plea cases rely heavily on the assumption that a

jurisdictions holding that fonnal consideration of defendants' Brady claims are barred by their
subsequent guilty pleas, the statutory approach may be defendants' only option. See Lampaziane, 251
F.3d at 523-25 (holding that the alleged Brady violation is a nonjurisdictional challenge waived by
guilty plea, but considering the facts of the claim anyway to decide the defendant's motion to
withdraw his plea).
86. See United States v. Avellino; 136 F.3d 249, 262 (3d Cir. 1998) ("And in the context of a
proven Brady violation, we would think it entirely inappropriate to allow the government to defeat the
motion [to withdraw a plea] by arguing that the warranted remedy for its own constitutional violation
is likely to cause it prejudice."). See also Schvey & Gates, supra note 81, at 1257 & n.1304 (noting
that Rule 32(e) motions to withdraw a plea shifts the burden to the government to show prejudice from
the withdrawal once the defendant establishes a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea). Some
courts, however, have resolved this tension by holding that where a constitutional violation is
established, a defendant has established manifest injustice as a matter of law. See supra note 80.
87. The Fifth Circuit's recent opinion in Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000),
provides perhaps the most thoughtful explanation of the minority view. See id. at 360-64. For a listing
of other courts refusing to recognize post-guilty plea Brady claims, see supra note 18.
88. Though a few courts have considered the accuracy of a defendant's conviction in ruling on a
post-guilty plea Brady claim, none thus far appear to have recognized accuracy as its own doctrinal
justification for considering those claims. See, e.g., Matthew v. Johnson, 201 F.3d 353, 370 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 291 (2000) (refusing to recognize habeas petitioner's post-plea Brady claim
while noting confidence in his factual guilt); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416,423 (8th Cir. 1988)
(applying the totality-of-the-circumstances approach and considering the factual basis supporting a
defendant's guilty plea); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 321-22 (6th Cir..1985) (same); State v.
Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1148, 1151-52 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (concluding that a Brady violation
equates to 'manifest injustice' while questioning the defendant's factual guilt). The court in Banks v.
United States, 920 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Va. 1996), comes closest to justifying post-plea Brady claims
based on the accuracy interests they promote, though even in that case the court only used accuracy
interests as a reason to follow other circuits recognizing post-plea Brady claims, rather than as an
independent doctrinal justification. See id. at 691.
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guilty plea defendant is in fact guilty. 89 Indeed, the presumption that guilty
pleas are factually accurate is the very reason the Court has been unwilling to
upset the finality of a guilty plea. 90 At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court's guilty plea cases clearly contemplate the continuing viability of
constitutional claims necessary to ensure the factual accuracy of a plea. 91 In
fact, the Court has explicitly (though perhaps inartfully) stated that a guilty
plea only precludes those claims consistent with factual guilt and conviction
92
once factual guilt is established. Hence, post-plea Brady claims may be

89. _See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) ("Defendants advised by
competent counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are presumptively capable of
intelligent choice in response to prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false selfcondemnation."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970) (noting that defendant's claim
did not question the truth or reliability of his guilty plea); McMann v Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 773
(1970) (same); Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 797 n.IO (1970) (noting the record's silence as
to any circumstance doubting the integrity of the defendant's guilty plea). See also McCoy & Mirra,
supra note 2, at 926 (noting that the Court's requirements that a plea be voluntary, intelligent, and in
some instances supported by a factual basis are consistent with an attempt to limit inaccurate results).
90. See, e.g., Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (noting that the outcome of the
defendant's case might be different if the Court believed that innocent defendants falsely condemn
themselves); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. at 773 (finding the defendant's coerced confession
claim irrelevant because his conviction was based on a guilty plea, not the allegedly coerced
confession, and the admissibility of that confession had no bearing on the accuracy of the plea). Given
its starting assumption that guilty pleas are accurate, the Court's general unwillingness to recognize
post-plea constitutional claims is hardly remarkable. As Professor Alschuler has noted in discussing
the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases,
It would have been enough for the Court to have said: "These defendants have solemnly admitted
their guilt, and that being so,. we do not care what may have happened to them in the past. The
whole purpose of criminal proceedings is to determine whether a defendant is guilty, and once that
question is satisfactorily answered in the affirmative, the state's consequent right to incarcerate the
defendant is established absolutely."
Alschuler, supra note 3, at 32-33. Ultimately, Professor Alschuler rejects this view of the Supreme
Court's guilty plea cases, though his analysis did not consider the Court's late 1975 decision in Menna
v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (presumably because the article was written before Menna was
decided). Still, even Professor Alschuler's analysis cites as an "extreme example" of an obviously
invalid plea the case where a prosecutor deliberately misleads defense counsel concerning the nature
of the state's evidence. See id. at 33.
91. See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (explaining that a guilty plea stops
the criminal adjudication process and that therefore a guilty plea defendant may not make claims
independent of factual guilt relating to· constitutional violations that occurred before the plea was
entered); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 757-58 (professing to take "great precautions" to guard
against inaccurate pleas and expecting lower courts to do the same, ensuring that there is nothing to
question the reliability of a defendant's admission of guilt). See also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61
(1975), discussed at infra note 92.
92. In Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), the Supreme Court departed from its general
approach to guilty pleas and allowed a post-plea double jeopardy claim to be heard. In explaining why
the case at bar was different from other claims that the Court had held were barred by a defendant's
guilty plea, the Court explained:
The point of these cases is that a counseled plea of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so
reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt
from the case. In most cases, factual guilt is a sufficient basis for the State's imposition of
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doctrinally viable if, like post-plea Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, they are vital to protecting the assumption underlying the
Court's guilty plea cases as a whole-that defendants who plead guilty are in
fact guilty. 93
At least at first glance, relying on accuracy interests to doctrinally justify
post-plea Brady claims is particularly appropriate for two reasons. First, the
chief goal of the criminal justice system-indeed, its very reason for
existence-is to accurately sort the factually guilty and innocent. 94 Thus, if
Brady plays a necessary role in that sorting process, its legitimacy in the plea
bargaining context is difficult to deny. Second, Brady's sole purpose at trial
is to protect the innocent from wrongful conviction.95 Thus, if Brady does
apply in the plea bargaining context, common sense tells us it is because
Brady can serve the same purpose there. The question, then, becomes one of
Brady's impact on the accuracy of guilty pleas, to which I turn next. 96

punishment. A guilty plea, therefore, simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not
logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the
way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established.
!d. at 62 n.2. Though the Court's use of a triple negative in the above passage is less than helpful, its
point remains (fairly) clear: a guilty plea presumptively resolves the issue of factual guilt, so unless a
post-plea claim questions that presumption-Qr, as in Menna, questions the imposition of punishment
even when factual guilt is established-it is irrelevant and therefore precluded.
93. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 967 (noting the compatibility of Brady and the Supreme
Court's guilty plea jurisprudence). Naturally, the analysis that follows assumes that the Supreme Court
is sincere in its stated desire to protect the innocent defendant tempted to plea bargain. Others have
questioned this premise. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 30-37 (recognizing the Court's professed
concern for accurate guilty pleas, but questioning its sincerity).
94. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 2002 (stating that the criminal justice system's mission is to
ascertain guilt and appropriate punishment); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect
Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2012 (1992) (noting that
the core function of the criminal justice process is the separation of the innocent from the guilty);
McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 915-16 (stating that a state's criminal procedure system is designed
to accurately identify the guilty and innocent). See also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88
(1935) ("The twofold arrn of[the law] is that guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer.").
95. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995) (noting that the question under Brady is
whether the defendant received a fair trial, meaning a trial verdict worthy of confidence); United States
v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,678 (1985) ("Consistent with 'our overriding concern with the justice of the
finding of guilt,' a constitutional error occurs, and the conviction must be reversed, only if the
evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the
trial.") (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976))) (citation omitted); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (noting Brady's overriding concern with the fairness of the finding of
guilt).
96. It would be a mistake to assume that because a constitutional right is essential to be accuracy
of convictions at trial, it is automatically essential to the accuracy of convictions following a plea. In
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), for example, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
coerced confession claim was barred by his guilty plea, id. at 773, although the Fifth Amendment's
protection against coerced confessions is undoubtedly designed to protect the accuracy of convictions
at trial. See Susan Bandes, Taking Some Rights Too Seriously: The Stale's Right to a Fair Trial, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1019, 1039 n.113 (1987) ([S]ome rights, such as the rights which guard against coerced
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II. BRADY'S EFFECT ON THE ACCURACY OF CONVICTIONS BASED ON A
GUILTY PLEA

Any assessment of Brady's effect on the accuracy of convictions based on
guilty plea must begin with a closer look at the nature of Brady's duty to
disclose. Recall that Brady only requires the disclosure of information that is
both favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment. 97 Focusing
first on Brady's materiality requirement, defendants at trial must establish "a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense,
the result of the proceeding would have been different."98 Usually, this
requirement leads courts to ask whether there is a reasonable probability (i.e.,
a good chance) that with Brady disclosure a defendant would have been
acquitted at trial, though conceivably courts could also ask whether a
defendant would have just received a lighter sentence. 99 Thus, at least at trial,
Brady's materiality standard typically results in a defendant's conviction
being overturned whenever a court's confidence in the accura~y of that
conviction is seriously shaken. 100
Given the nature of Brady's materiality standard at trial,' it is not
surprising that the doctrine plays a crucial role there in protecting the
innocent defendant from wrongful conviction. Indeed, Brady disclosure is
perfectly aligned with accuracy interests in the trial context, reversing a
conviction only when we believe the defendant may well be innocent.
Assuming Brady's materiality standard in the guilty plea context does the
same thing, 101 the doctrine's accuracy-enhancing effect on convictions
supported by a guilty plea is equally clear. Because of Brady's materiality
standard, guilty plea defendants who can establish a valid Brady claim by

confessions, specifically protect the accuracy of the fact-finding process."). Indeed, before McMann
was decided, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that allowing coerced confessions to come
before a jury posed a danger of convicting the innocent. See Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,728
(1966). See also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 34 (criticizing the Supreme Court's refusal to recognize
that claims affecting the accuracy of trial will automatically affect the accuracy of guilty pleas as well).
97. See supra text accompanying note 8.
98. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (relying on Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,694 (1984)).
99. Ironically, Brady involved the suppression of evidence relevant to the defendant's
punishment rather than guilt. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). At trial, Brady admitted his
involvement in a first-degree murder but claimed that a companion, Boblit, committed the actual
killing. Based on that version of events, Brady's attorney argued to the jury that his client should be
spared the death penalty. /d. The jury rejected the argument and sentenced Brady to death. /d. After
trial, Brady's attorney discovered that the prosecution had suppressed a statement by Boblit admitting
that he had actually strangled the victim, despite a request to see all of Boblit's out-of-court
statements. /d.
I 00. See supra note 95.
I 0 I. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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defmition also establish that they may well be innocent. Given that point, it is
difficult to imagine how Brady could not play a crucial role in promoting
accurate convictions based on a plea. Still, Brady's accuracy-enhancing
effect on guilty pleas is not solely attributable to its materiality standard; the
fact that Brady requires disclosure of information favorable to the defense
matters too. To understand why, we first need some understanding of a
defendant's decision-making process in considering a plea, which modem
choice theory applied to the plea bargaining context provides. 102
A. TheModel
.

I .! '

~'": ~· ".

t

l

'"

. : , ,

Using choice theory to explain the actions of plea pargaining parti<;:s is
hardly new. 103 Simply stated, choice theory tells us that prosecutors and
defendants plea bar~ain because both parties can avoid the costs and
uncertainties of trial. 04 When a conviction .at trial appears .imminent, plea
bargaining allows prosecutors to save the costs of going to trial, which they
disproportionately bear, and allows the defendants to benefit from those cost
105
When a conviction at
savings, as well as any cost savings of their
trial is less than certain, the push to plea bargain is even stronger. Defendants
bargain to avoid the chance that they could be convicted at trial and receive a
higher (possibly maximum) sentence, while prosecutors bargain to avoid the
possibility that trial could yield no conviction at all. 106 Thus, when the
outcome at trial is uncertain, both parties have something to lose by going to
trial aside from the cost of trial itself, and their incentive to plea bargain
increases to the extent that they believe their worst case scenario may come
true.

own.

I 02. Of course, not every guilty plea results from a plea bargain, but the overwhelming majority
do, and regardless, the decision-making dynamics are the same. In both cases, defendants consider the
costs of a conviction against its benefits, which include avoiding the punishment, personal
embarrassment, and financial outlay of trial. Thus, for analytical purposes, I treat every plea as a
bargained-for plea. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1593-94 (noting that it is futile to distinguish
between implicit and explicit inducements to plead guilty because both have the same effects on a
.
, .
defendant's decision-making).
103. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2.
104. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1935-40 (discussing incentives to plea bargain). The very
fact that defendants have a choice other than trial allows them to possibly improve their situation. See
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 309 (noting that defendants presumably make
themselves better off by plea bargaining or they would not strike the deals).
I 05. Taking a case to trial is more costly than settling it, and this is true to an even greater extent
for prosecutors who have limited resources and a seemingly unlimited number of cases. See
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 297; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1935.
106. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-40. This is not to deny that prosecutors bargain to
spare the costs of trial too. See supra note I 05 and accompanying text.
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Setting aside for a moment the additional costs associated with trial, the
corresponding risks that both prosecutors and defendants face lead them to
engage in essentially the same pre-plea decision-making analysis. 107 Both
parties identify their best option by weighing the uncertain but harsh
punishment at trial against the certain but lower punishment of a plea
bargain; the only difference between the two is whether their best option
imposes more punishment or less. 108 All other things being equal, rational
defendants will only bargain if they believe that the punishment in a plea
offer is less than the punishment that would result from a conviction at trial,
taking into account the fact that at trial they at least have a chance of
acquittal. 109 Rational prosecutors, by contrast, will only bargain if, all other
things being equal, they believe a plea offer imposes more punishment than
what they could get following a conviction at trial, again taking into account
the chance of acquittal there. 110 Because both prosecutors and defendants are
just looking to improve their lots vis-a-vis trial, each party will most likely
find a number of plea offers attractive, some being better deals than others. 111

I 07. I temporarily set aside the cost impetus to plea bargain in order to isolate the parties' reaction
to risk. Moreover, because the cost of going to trial is greater for prosecutors than defendants, see
supra note I 05, considering the costs of trial at this point unnecessarily complicates the analysis
without adding much predictive power to the defendant's decision-making process, the ultimate focus
of the model. For a model that simultaneously considers both factors, see Easterbrook, Criminal
Procedure, supra note 3, at 331-32. For a discussion of Brady's effect on a prosecutor's cost impetus
to bargain, see infra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
108. In short, both parties compare the expected punishment of trial with the expected punishment
of a plea bargain, both taking into account the chance of no punishment at all (i.e., an acquittal) at trial.
Defendants maximize their well-being by choosing the option with the lowest expected punishment
amount, while prosecutors do just the opposite. For more complex versions of this model, see
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 331-32; Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-40.
109. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 894 (noting that defendants choose the course of action
that keeps their penalty to a minimum-even if it means pleading guilty); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2,
at 1961 ("If the prosecutor wants to reach a bargain, she must offer the defendant something better
than the expected value of going to trial, discounted for the defendant's risk aversion."). See also
Douglass, supra note 14, at 447 (stating that defendants plea bargain because they believe the bargain,
a reduced sentence, is preferable to the result that would follow at trial, a higher sentence).
110. Restating the parties' basic treatment of uncertainty in formulaic fashion, rational defendants
will plead guilty when in their estimate C(t) x P(t) > P(pb), where C(t) is the chance of conviction at
trial, P(l) is the punishment expected at trial assuming a conviction, and P(pb) is the certain
punishment accompanying a plea bargain. For rational prosecutors, just the opposite is true; they will
strike a deal only when in their estimate C(t) x P(t) < P(pb).
Ill. Judge Easterbrook recognizes the same point, but uses the terms "maximum settlement offer"
and "minimum settlement demand" to represent the least attractive plea bargain each side would be
willing to accept. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 297. Under Judge
Easterbrook's model, defendants would find any offer attractive that was below their maximum
settlement demand (i.e., the most punishment they would be willing to take), while prosecutors would
find any offer attractive that was above their minimum settlement demand (i.e., the least amount of
punishment they would be willing to agree to). See id. The principle, however, is the same: both sides
have an array of possible plea bargains that they will, to varying degrees, find attractive.
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Thus, when considering both parties' choice dynamics together, we should
envision an overlapping range of mutually advantageous plea bargains, rather
than a single "hit or miss" bargaining point. 112
For defendants choosing between trial and a plea, the outcome of the
above analysis turns on the estimated chance of conviction at trial because
the other two factors in the equation-the expected punishment at trial and
expected punishment following a plea-are generally known. 113 If the chance
of conviction at trial is quite high, a defendant will most likely take a plea
offer with punishment only slightly lower than that expected at trial;
defendants who believe they will be convicted anyway will generally take
whatever discount in punishment they can get. Conversely, if the chance of
conviction at trial is exceedingly low, a defendant will likely pass on even the
sweetest of deals; defendants who are certain they will be acquitted at trial
will generally find no offer of punishment attractive. Thus, for defendants,
the estimated chance of conviction at trial is crucial to pre-plea decisionmaking because it affects the minimal senten~ing differential (i.e., the
difference between punishment at trial and punishment under a plea) required
to make pleading guilty their best option. In short, the lower the estimated
chance of conviction at trial, the more lucrative a plea offer must be. 114
Unfortunately, however, the chance of conviction at trial depends to a
large extent on something a defendant knows relatively little about: the
prosecutor's case. liS Though a defendant may have some knowledge of the
prosecutor's case from both formal and informal discovery, knowledge of all
(or even the most important part) of it is unlikely. 116 As a result, defendants
have to hazard a guess as to the overall strength of the government's
evidence, which is where their knowledge of guilt or innocence becomes
important. Typically, defendants know whether or not they are guilty of the

112. Seeid.
113. Admittedly, to some extent the punishment expected at trial is also unknown, but under any
scenario a defendant at least knows the maximum punishment possible for a particular offense, while
sentencing guidelines give an even more precise idea of the likely punishment. A prosecutor's
willingness to bargain also turns on the estimated chance of conviction at trial, though prosecutors'
information deficits are different. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37.
114. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 895.
115. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 448. The other factor affecting the chance of conviction of
trial is the strength of the defendant's case, which a defendant does know something about. See Scott
& Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37.
116. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 457-61 (discussing prosecutorial incentives to disclose
inculpatory and exculpatory information, but ultimately finding them inadequate to assure full
disclosure); Steven L. Friedman, Comment, Preplea Discovery: Guilty Pleas and the Likelihood of
Conviction at Trial, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 529-32 (1971) (criticizing informal and formal discovery
devices as a means of informing a defendant about the prosecutor's case).
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offense charged. 117 Thus, some know they are guilty and some (hopefully
fewer) know they are innocent, while a few are unsure of their status either
way because of some ambiguity in the facts, the law, or both. Though all
three groups have every incentive to protest their innocence to a prosecutor,
their private knowledge of guilt or innocence (where·existent) affects the way
they individually assess their chance of conviction at trial and the way they
weigh their options once that basic assessment is made.
To the extent we have any confidence whatsoever that evidence reflects
reality, we expect a prosecutor's case to be weaker where a defendant is
factually innocent than where a defendant is factually guilty. 118 After all, if a
defendant is truly innocent, there can only be so much evidence erroneously
suggesting guilt. In this regard, defendants' expectations are no different;
factually innocent defendants are generally more optimistic than guilty ones
in predicting the strength of the government's evidence at trial. 119 Indeed,
only guilty defendants have an exceptionally good reason to assume the
worst: they know they committed the crime. Thus, at least where they know
their status, innocent and guilty defendants will likely treat certain plea offers
differently because they make systematically different assessments of their
chance of conviction at trial. Because innocent .defendants are more
optimistic about the chance of an acquittal, they will view deals that would
be marginally advantageous for a guilty defendant as not advantageous at
all.12o
Even so, defendants who know they are innocent have another reason to
choose trial that guilty defendants do not: righteous indignation. For the
factually guilty defendant, pleading guilty may not be ideal, but it is not a
travesty of justice. For the innocent defendant, a guilty plea is exactly that. It
is false self-condemnation, which common sense tells us no defendant will
undertake lightly. 121 Thus, one would expect innocent defendants to make

117. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1936-37; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 984 (recognizing that
cases where defendants are without such information are limited). Prosecutors, by contrast, know the
strength of their case but not whether a given defendant is truly innocent or guilty. Scott & Stuntz,
supra note 2, at 1936-37. See also infra note 130.
118. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1937.
119. McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 924. See also Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1937
(recognizing that a defendant's true conduct with regard to an alleged offense bears powerfully on that
defendant's prediction about the evidence at trial).
120. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1969-70; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 80 n.97 (1988). Concededly, a
defendant's optimism in assessing the chance of conviction at trial will be affected by other factors as
well, including faith in the defendant's defense attorney and what the attorney said about the chance of
conviction at trial. Factors such as these, however, are not sufficiently systematic to be accounted for
in any meaningful way.
121. See McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 894 (recognizing that even innocent defendants facing
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fewer deals than guilty defendants not just because their estimate of the
chance of conviction at trial is lower, but also because they are more
reluctant to plead guilty in the first place.
At least two authors, Professors Scott and Stuntz, have disagreed with this
contention, arguing. that ·innocent defendants are highly risk averse and
therefore just as likely to bargain (in fact, more so in certain instances) as
their factually guilty counterparts. 122 According to Professors Scott and
Stuntz, guilty defendants are more prone to risk-taking than those who are
innocent because the very act of committing a crime suggests a preference
for gambling. 123 Though the premise underlying this argument-that
criminals tend to be risk-takers-is reasonable enough, the same rationale
suggests that innocent defendants will also be risk-takers, at least where they
have a criminal history. 124 Indeed, individuals with a criminal past may be
particularly susceptible to false charges not only because police "round up
the usual suspects" when investigating certain crimes, but also because police
may assume, based on a person's prior indiscretions, that an otherwise
ambiguous act was committed with criminal intent. 125 Thus, while criminal
activity may be an effective indicator of a defendant's risk-taking
proclivities, it is not perfectly (or even consistently or predictably) matched
to factually guilty defendants alone. 126 To the extent that innocent defendants
have a criminal background, they could be risk takers too.
Even innocent defendants without a criminal background, however, have
unique reasons to resist falsely pleading guilty. As others have noted, the
collateral consequences. of a conviction (even under a plea) are
disproportionately large for defendants whose records are otherwise clean. 127

strong cases may choose trial just to vindicate themselves).
122. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1948-49.
123. /d.at1943.
124. Professors Scott and Stuntz implicitly recognize the problem by noting: "(R]isk aversion is a
much more plausible assumption where innocent defendants are concerned (especially those with
relatively clean records)." /d. (emphasis added).
125. This famous line from the movie Casablanca is not far from reality, reflecting our intuition
that those who have committed crime before may well commit it again. The same idea explains why,
for example, police trying to solve a burglary will focus their attention on known burglars in the area,
whether or not that focus is justifiable. Although as a practical matter a criminal history may be helpful
in investigating crime, we also know that it can erroneously suggest guilt. Indeed, this risk is the
rationale behind Rule 404 of the Federal· Rules of Evidence, which generally excludes the use of
character evidence to establish a defendant's guilt at trial. See FED. R. Evto. 404 advisory committee
note.
126. In short, defendants who have a criminal record may well be innocent of the crime charged,
just as defendants without a criminal record may well be guilty. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at
1944 (recognizing that lack of a prior record will not help a prosecutor identify factually innocent
defendants).
127. See, e.g., McMunigal, supra note 16, at 987-88 (comparing the disincentives to plead guilty
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Thus, at least in some instances, the stigma· and possible employment
consequences of a conviction may make the innocent defendant without a
criminal record unwilling (or unable) to plead to anything at all. Moreover,
innocent defendants without a criminal record may assume, erroneously or
not, that they have less need for leniency from a prosecutor because their lack
of prior convictions will get them some leniency from the judge. 128 Given
these considerations, it is difficult to conclude that the risk preferences of
innocent and guilty defendants differ in a significant or meaningful way,
particularly as a factor offsetting the bargaininf: dynamic differences between
the two groups that are otherwise undisputed. 29 That being the case, choice
theory tells us exactly what we might surmise just by using common sense: it
is more difficult to get an innocent defendant to plead guilty than a defendant
who is in fact guilty. 130
To conclude that it is more difficult to get innocent defendants to plead
guilty, however, is not to say that they will never do so. Rather, it means that
innocent defendants require a larger sentencing differential to find a plea
bargain attractive than do factually guilty defendants, who are more willing
to strike a deal in the first place. 131 In· other words, because innocent

for defendants who have a record with the disincentives to plead guilty for defendants who do not have
a record).
.
128. In other words, defendants· with clean records discount the likely punishment at trial. /d. at
987.
129. Even Professors Scott and Stl!ntz recognize that an innocent defendant's estimate of the
chance of conviction at trial will differ from that of the guilty defendant. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2,
at 1937-39.
·
130. Several commentators agree with this proposition. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining,
supra note 3, at 1969-70; McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 924-25; Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1983.
Interestingly, Professors Scott and Stuntz posit that even if innocent defendants are more likely than
guilty defendants to refuse initially to bargain, guilty defendants will copy innocent defendants'
actions to (falsely) signal their innocence in hopes of triggering better offers, thereby erasing any
differences between the two groups that otherwise might have existed. Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at
1946. I find this rejoinder unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the guilty defendant's ability to copy the
innocent defendant's actions is limited. At some point, prosecutors under their own bargaining
constraints (political, office-policy-related, or otherwise) will make defendants a final offer, in effect
saying, "This is the best I can do; take it or leave it." At that point, copying the innocent defendant's
signal serves no purpose; even guilty defendants will just ask themselves whether they are better off
with the offer or trial. Second, even if this were not the case, guilty defendants would have a difficult
time copying an innocent defendant's signal because they do not know what that signal is. Like
prosecutors, guilty defendants cannot tell whether a defendant's decision to reject a plea signals
innocence, or a preference for risk-taking-or just that the defendant cannot afford a conviction. Thus,
while guilty defendants undoubtedly know how to protest their innocence, they do not know how to
act like innocent defendants because they do not know who those innocent defendants are. In the end,
then, the guilty defendant asks the same question as the innocent defendant: Am I better off with a plea
bargain or a trial? At least at the margin, innocent and guilty defendants will answer that question
differently-even though their different answers ar11 impossible for a prosecutor to recognize as such
because of other, equally plausible inferences one might draw from a refusal to bargain.
131. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 985-87 (exploring impact of sentencing differentials on

2002]

ACCURACY WHERE IT MATTERS·

29

defendants are already more inclined to choose trial, it will take a better
bargain to change their mind. Although the possibility of such a bargain is
low where the chance of conviction at trial is low (recall that even factually
guilty defendants will refuse a generous offer when they are certain of
acquittal at trial), 132 the possibility of an offer too good for even the innocent
defendant to refuse is much higher where the chance of conviction at trial is
high. 133 After all, where they believe they will be convicted anyway, even
innocent defendants will just be looking to cut their losses. 134 As a result,
choice theory also provides an important insight as to one reason innocent
defendants plead guilty: they are faced with an intolerably high estimate of
the chance of conviction at trial. 135

B. Introducing Brady
Given our discussion thus far, Bratjy's role in protecting the accuracy of
convictions based on a guilty pl~a seems .all too .obvious. Disclosure of
material informa~ion favorable to ~e defense l()wers a defendant's estimate
of the ch~ce of conviction at trial, which in turn increases the minimum
sentencing differential necessary to make pleading guilty that defendant's
best optio~! 36 For the innocent defendant, the effect is even more
exaggerated, further increasing the minimuiT,l. benefit necessary to induce a
false guilty plea. 137 Of course, disclo1sing · favorable information will not
innocent defendant's willingness to plead guilty).,
132. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
133. Moreover, the coercive influence of a high sentencing deferential is not at all dissipated by
competent counsel. McMunigal, supra note 16, at 988-89. One can, however, at least debate the harm
of an innocent defendant pleading guilty because the deal offered is .too good to refuse. See infra note
134.

134. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 34 ("[I]t is better to be an innocent person on probation than
an innocent person in prison."); Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1969 ("[I]t is bad
enough to be unjustly convicted, and worse yet to be unjustly convicted and receive a sentence higher
than one could have obtained."). Although the minimum sentencing differential required by an
innocent defendant to plead guilty is larger than the differential required by a guilty defendant, it is
still smaller where the chance of conviction at trial is high in comparison to where it is low. See supra
text accompanying notes 113-14.
135. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1970 (contending that innocent
defendants plead guilty not because of a flaw in the bargaining process, but because of flaws in the
trial process that result in a significant risk of conviction regardless of actual innocence or guilt);
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 311 (arguing that if the penalty of going to trial is
·
high enough, even the innocent will plead guilty).
136. A number of commentators have recognized this point. See, e.g., Douglass, supra note 14, at
441-42; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 990-97. See also McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 933 (noting
that overestimated chances of conviction at trial can create a substantial risk of inaccurate pleas).
137. Because Brady disclosure lowers a defendant'sestimate of the chance of conviction at trial, it
simultaneously makes any given plea offer less attractive, increasing even further the minimum
sentencing differential required to make pleading guilty an innocent defendant's best option. See supra
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prevent all innocent defendants from pleading guilty, for a sentencing
differential could still be coercively high. 138 Nevertheless, it will at least
prevent defendants from grossly overestimating their chance of conviction at
trial, reducing the likelihood that innocents will plead guilty just because
their only other option appears to be futile. 139
Even so, choice theory suggests that Brady disclosure is essential to the
accuracy of guilty pleas for other, though perhaps less obvious, reasons as
well. As previously noted, some defendants (though relatively few) do not
know whether they are innocent or guilty because of some ambiguity in the
140
Here, too, Brady has a role to play, for it can remedy the
facts or law.
information defects that keep these defendants from knowing their true status
.and bargaining accordingly. 141 Admittedly, Brady's helpfulness in this regard
is limited where the uncertainty in a defendant's status results from an
ambiguity in the law as opposed to the facts, but even then a defendant could
only benefit by knowing the correct facts under the law in the first place. In
short, to the extent that defendants who know they are innocent act
differently (at least at the margin) than those who do not, it pays in terms of
accuracy to assist that sorting process-which is precisely what Brady
does. 142
Still, Brady's accuracy-enhancing effect on guilty pleas is not solely
attributable to defendants' decision-making, for Brady influences the way

text accompanying notes 113-14; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991-92.
138. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 996-97. One can, however, at least debate the harm of an
innocent defendant pleading guilty because the deal offered is too good to refuse. See supra note 134.
139. Importantly, this analysis does not in any way suggest that a defendant is entitled to an
accurate assessment of the chance of conviction at trial in order to enter a valid plea, a proposition
squarely rejected by the Supreme Court. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Rather, Brady's
effect on a defendant's estimate of the prosecutor's case against him is relevant because it explains
why the disclosure of Brady information promotes factually accurate pleas, a justification for
recognizing post-guilty plea Brady claims of its own.
140. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; McMunigal, supra note 16, at 984 (noting that a
defendant's inability to resolve critical factual issues relevant to guilt or innocence is a limited, but
important, subset of all guilty plea cases).
141. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 970-84. Indeed, in the extreme, certain defendants could
believe they are factually guilty (and bargain accordingly) only to find out later that they are not. Cases
where Brady has served this "self-identifying" purpose are not uncommon. See. e.g., Carroll v. State,
474 S.E.2d 737 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant was entitled to withdraw her guilty
plea to vehicular homicide where she entered the plea without knowing her speed at the time of the
accident and where the state suppressed information that defendant's speed did not contribute to
accident); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that defendant was entitled
to withdraw his guilty plea to vehicular manslaughter where the government suppressed eyewitness
information establishing that accident occurred when defendant's tire had a blow-out, even though
defendant admitted using marijuana beforehand).
142. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 970-84 (analyzing Brady's effect on a defendant's ability
to identify his status properly, so that his guilty plea can be relied on as an accurate reflection of
factual guilt).
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prosecutors do business too. Until now, we have set aside the additional costs
associated with trial to isolate the parties' treatment of risk in the plea
bargaining process. 143 Yet these costs provide an incentive to plea bargain as
well, and as they increase, so does the attractiveness of pleading a case rather
144
than taking it to trial. For prosecutors, compliance with Brady's disclosure
145
requirements is costly in time and effort. Thus, unless Brady applies in the
plea bargaining context as well as trial, the additional costs it imposes gives
prosecutors yet another reason (aside from the risk of acquittal) to bargain
cases with favorable evidence-and hence another reason to make a
favorable plea offer. 146 Because Brady cases are by definition weaker to start
with (and therefore already prone to quite lucrative plea offers), 147 limiting
Brady to the trial context merely exacerbates the initial problem-increasing
even further the incentive to plead guilty for those we are least certain ought
to do so. 148

143. See supra note 107.
144. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
·145. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 504-05 (noting that Brady disclosure in the plea bargaining
context would entail time and effort); Sheppard, supra note 43, at 181 (noting that compliance with
Brady's disclosure mandate is expensive for prosecutors in terms of time). Indeed, the cost of
complying with Brady disclosure may be one reason prosecutors in California have ·required
defendants to explicitly waive their Brady rights before conferring plea bargaining concessions, the
legality of which is currently before the Supreme Court. See supra note 14.
146. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 997 ("A criminal justice system that condemns
concealment of Brady material as a due process violation at trial, but not in plea bargaining, essentially
encourages prosecutors to divert Brady cases. into plea bargaining."). See also supra text
accompanying note 37 (noting moral hazard problem that results from limiting Brady to trial context).
Ironically, Professor Douglass argues that the costs of applying Brady in the plea bargaining context
are so significant that they provide a reason not to recognize post-plea Brady claims. See Douglass,
supra note 14, at 505-07. It would seem, however, that disclosing Brady information prior to a guilty
plea would still be less costly to prosecutors than going to trial-especially when other cases are
competing for their attention and the chance of prevailing on a Brady case is comparatively small. In
short, suppressing Brady information will not change the fact that a case is weak, so prosecutors still
have all the incentive they need to strike a deal. Moreover, as others have argued, Brady protections
actually promote plea bargaining by assuring defendants that they do not have to go to trial just to
know evidence in their favor. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at I017 ("If the Brady right were openly
recognized as not applying in guilty plea cases ... defendants would be given an increased incentive to
go to trial on the chance that Brady material might be forthcoming."); Note, supra note 52, at 1019
(recognizing the symbolic importance of extending Brady protections to the plea bargaining defendant
as an assurance of fair dealing).
147. See McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991; Sheppard, supra note 43, at 170.
148. As Professor McMunigal rightly recognizes, suppressing Brady information during plea
bargaining causes three factors to converge, each of which increases the possibility of convicting the
innocent: weak cases (suggesting questionable guilt to start with), larger sentencing differentials
(reflecting a prosecutor's eagerness to plea bargain the weak cases), and ignorance of evidence
suggesting innocence (causing a defendant .to overestimate the ·chance of conviction at trial). See
McMunigal, supra note 16, at 991-92.
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C. Potential Accuracy Pitfalls ofBrady in the Plea Bargaining Context
Although affording Brady protections to those who plead guilty will
protect some innocent defendants, it will undoubtedly protect some guilty
defendants too. Indeed, because we are by defmition concerned with
defendants who have already said they are guilty once, the concern that
Brady will mainly benefit the guilty is substantial-especially when one
considers the potential consequences of an overturned plea. Although
invalidating a defendant's guilty plea because of a Brady violation would
technically only result in a new trial, the potential windfall to defendants who
prevail on their post-guilty plea Brady claims is enormous. Retrying cases is
not only costly for prosecutors, but difficult as well, because time. is not a
prosecutor's friend. 149 Witnesses relocate or are no longer willing to testify,
evidence may not have been properly preserved (or preserved at all), and the
momentum to prosecute the case again is almost nonexistent. 150 Thus, when
considering Brady's overall effect on the accuracy of convictions supported
by a guilty plea, it must be conceded that affording Brady protections to the
guilty plea defendant will, at least in some instances, result in the factually
guilty avoiding conviction altogether. 151
Still, Brady's propensity to protect the factually guilty is uniquely selflimiting. As already discussed, Brady's materiality standard requires
defendants to show a reasonable probability of innocence in order to
establish a Brady violation at trial. 152 Assuming Brady's materiality standard
in the plea bargaining context does the same thing, 153 the only defendants
who would prevail on their post-plea Brady claims would be the ones we
believe may well be innocent. As for those defendants, the possibility that
they are guilty instead is a risk our criminal justice system mandates we take.
As exemplified by the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden-of-proof in
criminal trials, the core philosophy underlying our criminal justice system is
that it is better for ten guilty defendants to go free than for an innocent
defendant to suffer unjustly. 154 Thus, the fact that post-plea Brady claims will

149. Although time is also not a defendant's friend, the fact that prosecutors bear the burden of
proof at trial means that evidentiary problems arising upon remand are particularly problematic for the
government.
150. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra note 3, at 318.
151. Given the dynamics discussed above, however, it may also just mean that the guilty will end
up repleading to a more lenient deal. See supra Part III.A. Even that possibility, however, should be
considered a potential downside of applying Brady in the plea bargaining context.
152. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
154. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (viewing the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard as a "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
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on occasion protect the factually guilty as well as the factually innocent is
hardly unacceptable; our criminal justice ethos requires no less. 155
Setting aside the above concern, two more potential accuracy pitfalls of
Brady in the plea bargaining context deserve consideration. In a recent
article, Professor Douglass raises substantial concerns about Brady's ability
to promote factually accurate guilty pleas, in part because of the effects
Brady disclosure may have on a prosecutor's incentives. 156 The key to
understanding Professor Douglass's point is the recognition that not all Brady
evidence is alike. Some evidence, commonly known as "exculpatory
evidence," favors a defendant by affirmatively establishing innocence. Other
evidence, commonly known as "impeachment evidence," favors a defendant
by raising doubts about the prosecutor's proof of guilt. 157 Though the
materiality standard for both types of Brady evidence is the same (in the
guilty plea context, defendants must show that the violation affected their

convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"). See also McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at
916-17 (concluding that the criminal justice system's concern for accuracy is essentially a one-sided
interest in not convicting the innocent).
ISS. Indeed, protecting the guilty is to some extent an indispensable part of protecting the
innocent because aside from making inferences from the evidence, we simply cannot tell the two
groups apart. See Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining, supra note 3, at 1970 ("Innocent persons are accused
not because prosecutors are wicked but because these innocents appear to be guilty.") (emphasis
omitted); McCoy & Mirra, supra note 2, at 922 ("It would be nearly impossible to distinguish guilty
pleas entered by the innocent from guilty pleas entered by the guilty."). This is not to say, however,
that the innocent and the guilty do not respond to plea bargaining differently, at least at the margin. See
supra note 130 and accompanying text. Moreover, it is worth noting that post-guilty plea ineffective
assistance of counsel claims raise the same concerns, but that has not kept the Supreme court from
recognizing their legitimacy. See supra note 6.
156. Douglass, supra note 14, at 493-99. Professor Douglass also argues that few innocent
defendants would challenge the validity of their plea based on a Brady violation (or win, even if they
did) because they are risk averse and received the biggest benefit from pleading guilty (due to the large
sentencing differentials that accompany weak cases). /d. at 502. As already discussed, I disagree with
the risk aversion assumption. See supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text. As to the benefits
innocent defendants likely receive, I agree that we should expect them to be substantially large, but I
disagree that large benefits will always prevent Brady from making a difference in the innocent
defendant's plea decisions. Granted, sometimes they will, see supra text accompanying note 138, but
another factor causing innocent defendants to plead guilty is an intolerably high estimate of the chance
of conviction at trial-and Brady disclosure does make a difference there. See supra text
accompanying notes 135-39. Moreover, even defendants who reaped substantial benefits from a deal
the first time around (whether innocent or guilty) have at least one reason to challenge their pleas
anyway: the government may have an extremely difficult time reconstructing its case. See supra text
accompanying note ISO. See also infra note 179 (arguing that Brady's post-plea materiality standard
should not consider the benefit a defendant received from a plea bargain). I address Professor
Douglass's remaining points at supra note 146, infra text accompanying notes 171-73, and infra notes
176-77.
157. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-96 (explaining the difference between "directly
exculpatory" evidence and "impeaching" evidence). An example of exculpatory evidence is
information about the identity or location of an alibi witness, and an example of impeachment
evidence is the prior perjury conviction of a prosecution witness.
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decision to plead guilty), 158 the fact that impeachment evidence is tied to the
government's proof of guilt results in a frightening possibility: prosecutors
can circumvent disclosure by limiting what defendants know about their
case. 159 Indeed, defendants who know nothing at all about the case against
them could never meet the materiality standard for impeachment Brady
evidence; if defendants are ignorant about the prosecutor's proof of guilt,
how could knowledge of the impeachment information that goes with it ever
affect their decision to plead? Thus, at least when it comes to impeachment
evidence (which is by far the most common Brady type), 160 Professor
Douglass is exactly right: the less defendants know, the less protection they
get. 161 Prosecutors, then, have an incentive to withhold information, and that
incentive is strongest in the cases they most need to plead-the ones too
weak to win at trial. 162
Though certainly disturbing, Professor Douglass's adverse incentive
problem is at least limited by a number of practical restraints. As Professor
Douglass recognizes, prosecutors have an incentive to disclose. inculpatory
evidence despite the presence of matching impeachment information: they
want the defendant to plead guilty. 163 Yet even if a prosecutor decided to
stonewall in a given case, the fact that inculpatory information is routinely
provided in other cases would create a problem of its own. Defense counsel
are repeat players in the criminal justice system and a wary bunch by

158. The precise showing required by the materiality standard is discussed at infra Part Ill.
159. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-98. Interestingly, prosecutors in California have actually
made the distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evidence that Professor Douglass predicts,
contending that their Brady disclosure obligations before trial are limited to exculpatory, as opposed to
impeachment, information. See Franklin, supra note 14, at 568-69 (discussing Brady waivers).
160. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494-95 (noting that most Brady evidence is impeachment
evidence).
161. Professor Douglass does not argue that the same problem exists for exculpatory evidence not
tied to the government's case. /d. at 496. Moreover, Professor Douglass appears to concede that
limiting Brady to trial would have an adverse incentive problem of its own; as the Ninth Circuit has
recognized, it would allow prosecutors to avoid Brady disclosure altogether by pleading cases with
Brady information. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 498; supra note 37 and accompanying text.
. 162. As Professor Douglass rightly recognizes, prosecutors have an incentive to disclose
weaknesses in the strongest cases (where the disclosure does not matter) and to conceal weaknesses in
the weakest cases (where it does). /d. at 497-98. The less Brady information prosecutors disclose, the
better their cases look-and the better their cases look, the less prosecutors must offer to induce a plea.
Jd. Of course, if Brady applies in the plea bargaining context, the incentive problem is no problem at
all because prosecutors then have a constitutionally-imposed duty to disclose, regardless of their own
predilections.
163. !d.. at 498. See also Uviller, supra note 2, at 114. On the other hand, it must be conceded that
in some cases, disclosure of impeachment information may be so detrimental to other interests
prosecutors may have, such as protecting the identity of cooperating witnesses, that they may still
prefer to circumvent such disclosure by keeping certain inculpatory information to themselves. To the
extent they do so, however, the harm is debatable. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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necessity; no doubt they would interpret a prosecutor's refusal to share
evidence of guilt as a signal that something was seriously amiss with the
government's case. 164 Thus, even if prosecutors tried to circumvent Brady's
disclosure mandate for impeachment evidence by bluffing, they would not be
very successful. Indeed, it is not entirely clear whether successfully
circumventing Brady is even possible, for a defendant could always learn
about inculpatory information from other sources. 165 If, for example, a
defendant's own investigation identified government witnesses or other
evidence with matching impeachment information, that defendant would still
be entitled to the impeachment information despite a prosecutor's best efforts
to conceal it. Thus, the prospect of prosecutors successfully avoiding Brady
disclosure by refusing to share evidence of guilt is troubling, but at least
unlikely. 166
Nevertheless, even if prosecutors withheld inculpatory and impeachment
evidence, the result for defendants ignorant of both is not terribly troubling.
As previously discussed, one factor causing innocent defendants to plead
guilty (and the factor most relevant to our analysis) is an intolerably high
estimate of the chance of conviction at trial. 167 Yet unless they have a reason
to conclude differently, innocent defendants are unlikely to make such high
estimates; to the contrary, they have every reason to believe they will be
vindicated at trial and acquitted. 168 Thus, to the extent prosecutors might
suppress inculpatory evidence to avoid Brady disclosure of matching
impeachment information, the harm is debatable. So long as innocent
defendants remain ignorant of the facts falsely condemning them, they have
no reason to plead guilty falsely and no need for information mitigating those
falsely-condemning facts. 169 The adverse incentive problem, in short, is

164. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1588 (noting that "many defense attorneys have a continuing
relationship with prosecutors that is more reciprocal than adversarial").
165. From my own experience, I found that defendants often know much about a prosecutor's
case from their own investigation, even if it is only informal. Word travels fast on the street, and
defendants may know when former allies tum against them even before prosecutors do.
166. A defendant may also be entitled to impeachment evidence without knowing the inculpatory
evidence it matches if that evidence is crucial to an exculpatory evidence lead. In any event, it is
entirely possible that prosecutors applying Brady in the plea bargaining context will not even think
about the issues discussed above because they will continue to just ask themselves whether disclosure
could make a difference at trial. See infra text accompanying note 230.
167. See supra text accompanying note 135.
168. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1939 ("Since [the defendant] knows whether he is
innocent, he is well positioned to guard against overly high assessments of the likelihood of
conviction."); supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
169. Impeachment evidence is only important to the innocent defendant because it counteracts the
coercion to plea bargain that knowledge of overwhelming inculpatory evidence creates. Thus, without
the coercion to falsely plead guilty, the information mitigating that coercion loses its significance as
well.
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arguably not a problem at all because the only defendants willing to plead
guilty without knowing the evidence against them most likely know
something we do not: they committed the crime. 170
Recognizing the latter point is also essential in addressing another
perceived accuracy pitfall of Brady's application in the plea bargaining
context: its inability to provide the information necessary. for a defendant to
engage in fully informed decision-making about a plea. Admittedly, Brady
disclosure only provides defendants with half of the information they need to
accurately assess their chance of conviction at trial, revealing the weaknesses
in a prosecutor's case but never the strengths. 171 Again, however, innocent
defendants ignorant of inculpatory evidence are unlikely to plead guilty
falsely on that account; they view the unknowns in a prosecutor's case
172
optimistically because they know they are in fact innocent.
Thus, while
innocent defendants may overestimate the chance of conviction at trial
because they know about inculpatory evidence but not exculpatory or
impeaching evidence, their ignorance of inculpatory evidence . alone is
unlikely to have the same affect. In sum, when it comes to the strengths in a
prosecutor's case (at least during plea bargaining), what innocent defendants
·
do not know will not hurt them. 173
Given these considerations, it would appear that Brady's role in securing
accurate convictions is just as essential in the plea bargaining context as it is
at trial. That being the case, doctrinally justifying post-plea Brady claims is
not so difficult after all; like the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, Brady is
simply too important a protection for the innocent to limit its application· to

170. For the same reason, the fact that defendants often plea bargain early, before .either party h~s
much information, is of limited concern. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 455-56 & n.75 (noting that
the earliest pleas are most valuable to the parties but made on the least amount of information). The
very fact that these defendants are willing to plead guilty in the dark should tell us that they are
predicting the outcome at trial based in part on information of their own-i.e., their private knowledge
of guilt or innocence.
171. As Professor Douglass explains, "Brady may suggest some 'melting' around the edges of the
government's case, but it will not expose the iceberg that the defendant may face at trial." Douglass,
supra note 14, at 453. Nor will Brady require disclosure ofnonevidentiary information relevant to the
strength of a prosecutor's case, such as the fact that a witness hl:ls died. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 44
N.Y.2d 76, 82 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978). See also David Aaron, Note, Ethics, Law
Enforcement, and Fair Dealing: A Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose Nonevidentiary Information, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 3005, 3006-07 (1999) (explaining that Brady does not require disclosure of
nonevidentiary facts because knowledge of such facts would not prevent factually inaccurate
convictions).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
173. The same cannot be said for factually guilty defendants, but there is no harm in factually
guilty defendants pleading guilty-even if oniy because they overestimated their chance of conviction
at trial.
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tria1. 174 To conclude that Brady is necessary to secure accurate convictions
based on a guilty plea, however, is not to say that courts recognizing postguilty plea Brady claims have exhausted the doctrine's full potential in that
regard. As Professor Douglass rightly recognizes, post-plea Brady claims are
rarely successful because defendants can rarely' meet Brady's materiality
standard after a plea. 175 While practical problems such as the absence of a
trial record are partly to blame for this difficulty, 176 I argue in Part III that the
most serious problem is more innate: the materiality standard currently used
to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims is itself too onerous. 177

174. Supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text This is not to suggest, however, that Brady rights are
therefore inalienable; that is a different question altogether. See supra note 14.
175. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 479 & n.l84 (noting that post-guilty plea Brady claims are
"an exercise in futility for most defendants" and listing several dozen cases where the reviewing court
refused to find a post-guilty plea Brady claim material); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I, 61 n.204 (1997) (noting that
cases overturning guilty pleas based on a Brady violation are almost nonexistent); Franklin, supra note
14, at 590 & n.156 (noting that in only two of several dozen post-guilty plea Brady cases a defendant
succeeded in meeting the materiality standard !lnd listing those findings). In my own search of over
one hundred state and federal post-guilty plea Brady cases, I found only a dozen of instances when a
defendant prevailed on his claim. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1324 (2d Cir. 1988);
Lewis v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S.D. W. Va. 1997); Banks v. United States, 920 F.
Supp. 688, 69~ (E.D. Va. 1996); United States v. Millan-Colon, 829 F. Supp. 620, 636 (S.D.N.Y.
1993); Carroli v. State~ 474 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144,
I I 53 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); State v. Johnson, 544 So.2d 767, 773 (La. Ct. App. 1989); Lee v. State,
573 S.W.2d 131, 134-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576,581-82 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2001); People v. Curry, 6.27 N.Y.S.2d 214,216 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Gibson v. State, 514
S.E.2d 3.20 (S.C. 1999); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); State v.
Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 598 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999). In almost every one of those cases, the evidence
of actual innocence is exceptionally strong. See infra note 198.
176.. Douglass, supra note 14, at 480. While I agree with Professor Douglass that the absence of a
trial record makes applying Brady in the plea bargaining context more difficult, the same difficulty has
not made post-guilty plea Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claims unworkable. In
both cases, courts considering a post-plea claim conduct evidentiary hearings on the issue, considering
factors such as the factual basis supporting a· defendant's plea, records of formal discovery, and
preliminary hearing testimony. Still, to the extent defendants making a post-plea Brady claim are
disadvantaged from the start, we have yet another reason to ensure Brady's materiality standard in the
plea bargaining context is not unduly harsh, the topic of infra Part Ill. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at
I 78 (arguing that Brady's materiality standard should be lower in cases where a defendant's
conviction rests upon a guilty plea because neither side has had the opportunity to present evidence).
177. I must concede that another problem with Brady's application in the plea bargaining context
is equally problematic: its prospective duty to disclose information that can only retrospectively be
defined. This problem, however, is identical to the definitional problem accompanying Brady's
application at trial. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 699-705 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (lamenting the inherent difficulty in applying prior to trial a definition of materiality that
turns on the outcome at trial). Moreover, it is entirely unclear whether definitional ambiguity in
Brady's duty to disclose is a good thing or bad. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439-40 (1995)
(noting that uncertainty in Brady's duty to disclose will encourage prosecutors to resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure).
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USING ACCURACY INTERESTS TO DEFINE MATERIALITY IN THE PLEA
BARGAINING CONTEXT

Because accuracy interests provide the strongest doctrinal and normative
justification for applying Brady in the plea-bargaining context, it ma,kes
sense to look to those same interests as a guide in fashioning a materiality
standard best suited for post-guilty plea Brady claims. As mentioned early in
Part II, Brady's accuracy-enhancing effect on guilty pleas is maximized
when the materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims does just what
Brady's materiality standard does at trial, overturning a conviction whenever
our confidence in a defendant's guilt is seriously shaken. 178 Thus, the ideal
materiality standard for post-guilty plea Brady claims translates into the
guilty plea context a defendant's required showing at trial-that with Brady
disclosure, there is "a reasonable probability that . . . the result of the
proceeding would have been different." 179
·
Adapting Brady's materiality standard at trial to the guilty plea context,
courts have thus 'far unanimously required·defendants to show a reasonable
probability that with Brady disclosure, they would have insisted upon going
to trial. 180 Given the current doctrinal landscape, this . result is hardly

I 78. See supra notes I 00-0 I and accompanying text.
179. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). See also text accompanying supra note
98. Recognizing what Brady's post-plea materiality standard should require is essential to answering
one last point made by Professor Douglass. See supra text accompanying note I 56. As Professor
Douglass recognizes, we can expect innocent defendants to have the weakest cases and so we can also
expect them to receive the most benefit from pleading guilty; they demand a larger sentencing
differential (because they are innocent) arid prosecutors are willing to give it {because they will likely
lose at trial). Douglass, supra note I 4, at 486c87. That being the case, Professor Douglass is right that
innocent defendants will find it most difficult to prevail on post-plea claims-at least when courts (like
the Eight Circuit) consider the benefit a defendant received in pleading guilty. See supra note 44.
Concededly, if courts consider the benefits a defendant received in pleading guilty when determining
whether suppressed favorable information is material, Brady violations will be the most difficult to
prove in the weakest cases. The Supreme Court, however, has told us that Brady violations should be
easiest to prove in the weakest 'cases; if the evidence against a defendant is already questionable, it will
take less Brady evidence to show that the result of the proceeding may well have been different. See
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, I 12-13 (1976) (admonishing courts to evaluate the materiality of
suppressed favorable evidence in light of other incriminating evidence supporting a defendant's
conviction). It would appear, then, that considering the benefit a defendant received from a plea will
consistently lead us to the wrong result, and that therefore courts should not do it. Still, the
phenomenon bolsters the point of this section-that when defining materiality for post-plea Brady
claims, it is crucial to remain focused on what Brady's materiality standard does at trial, reversing a
defendant's conviction whenever Brady information creates a reasonable probability of innocence.
180. See, e.g., United States v. Walters, 269.F.3d 1207, 1214-15 (lOth Cir. 2001); United States v.
Avellino, 136 F.3d 249,261-62 (2d Cir. 1998); Sanchez v. United States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir.
1995); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416, 424 (8th Cir. 1988); Indelicato v. United States, 106 F.
Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Mass. 2000); State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144, 1152 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994);
State v. Parsons, 775 A.2d 576, 580-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d
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surprising. In 1985, the Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart 181 adopted the
"insist upon trial" standard as the prejudice showing necessary to establish a
post-guilty plea ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 182 Because Brady's
materiality standard at trial was borrowed from the prejudice prong for
ineffective assistance of counsel claims at trial, 183 the most obvious
materiality standard for post-guilty plea Brady claims is the prejudice
standard adopted in Hill. In theory, Hill's prejudice standard is less than ideal
for post-plea Brady claims because the government plays a role in bringing
Brady violations about, a fact the Supreme Court has previously found
significant. 184 Still, the Court has ignored this difference between the claims
in the trial context, so it is hard to imagine why the two standards should
differ in claims made after a plea. As a doctrinal matter, then, the "insist upon
trial" materiality standard currently used to judge post-guilty plea Brady
claims can be considered a foregone conclusion.
Nevertheless, while going to trial· may be one way a guilty plea
proceeding's result could be different; it is not the only way. Clearly, the
result would also be different if Brady disclosure caused a defendant to reject
a particular bargain and strike a ·better· deal. Although a number of
commentators have recognized that Brady disclosure may just lead to a better
bargain for some defendants, 185 none have considered this possibility in the
context of identifying the proper materiality standard for post-guilty plea

320,325 (S.C. 1999); State v. Sturgeon, 605 N.W.2d 589, 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
.'
181.- 474 u.s. 52 (1985).
182. !d. at 59.
183. See United States v .. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (borrowing from the prejudice
standard established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). Interestingly, the test
announced in Strickland for establishing prejudice. was, in tum, based on one of three materiality
standards employed in a previous Brady case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (selecting the appropriate test for prejudice and citing Agurs).
184. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at Ill (noting that Brady's materiality standard reflects the fact that the
government is responsible for Brady violations). Paradoxically, the Supreme Court in both Hill and
Strickland justified adopting the same showing as the prejudice standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel claims by stating that "[t]he government is not responsible for, and hence not able to prevent,
attorney errors that will result in reversal of a conviction or sentence." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693;
Hill, 474 U.S. at 57 (quoting Strickland).
185. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 489 n.224 ("Indeed, the likely result of a successful postconviction Brady claim is a guilty plea by the same defendant with an agreement for a reduced
sentence."); Franklin, supra note 14, at 591 (noting that impeachment information will unlikely cause
defendants to go trial; most will simply sign a better plea agreement); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1617
(noting that undisclosed information most likely affects the terms of the plea agreement). See also
Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 271 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that if the defendant
had recognized the potential constitutional violation, he might have been able to secure a more
favorable bargain); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1958 (arguing that most attorney error in the plea
bargaining context is not constitutionally cognizable because it affects the price of a plea rather than its
existence).
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Brady claims. Perhaps, however, we should. After all, Brady's materiality
standard at trial only requires defendants to show a reasonable probability
that the result of the proceeding would have been different; 186 it does not
require them to show how. Though the point is hardly worth mentioning at
the guilt phase of trial, where the only alternative to a conviction is acquittal,
it has much more force at the sentencing phase of trial-and Brady applies
there too. 187 Thus, the most comparable post-plea materiality standard to
Brady's materiality standard at trial only requires defendants to show that a
particular plea would not have occurred, regardless of what else would have.
In short, it requires defendants to show a reasonable probability that with
Brady disclosure, they would have rejected the plea they in fact took. 188 Not
surprisingly, the difference between the "reject the plea" and "insist upon
trial" materiality standards is palpable, 189 and that difference has accuracy
implications of its own. To see why, we return to the plea bargaining
defendant's decision-making dynamics, extending the analysis modeled
above.
A. The "Insist Upon Trial" Materiality Standard.
The "insist upon trial" materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims is
based on the assumption that where Brady disclosure creates a reasonable
probability of a different result at trial, defendants will insist upon resolving

186. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
187. Thus, where a defendant's Brady claim challenges the sentence received at trial (as did the
claim in Brady itself), see supra note 99, the defendant need only show a reasonable probability that
with Brady disclosure, the sentence would have been different. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
89-90 ( 1963 ). Because plea bargaining creates a particular outcome as to guilt and punishment at once,
it is even more apparent that the materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims should only require
defendants to show that they would not have agreed to the bargain they in fact took.
188. Although this showing also means that defendants would have insisted upon trial in lieu of
that particular plea, there is no indication that courts using the "insist upon trial" materiality standard
really have the "reject the plea" showing in mind. See, e.g., Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 ("[T]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.") (emphasis added); Sanchez v. United
States, 50 F.3d 1448, 1454 (9th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he issue in a case involving a guilty plea is whether
there is a reasonable probability that but for the failure to disclose the Brady material, the defendant
would have refused to plead and would have gone to trial.") (emphasis added). In any event, equating
the two standards is unrealistic because it fails to account for the possibility that the parties will
continue to bargain and reach agreement on a different deal. See infra text accompanying notes 212-13
(recognizing continuing incentives for parties to bargain).
189. Put in most stark terms, the "insist upon trial" materiality standard asks what a defendant
would have done, while the "reject the plea" materiality standard asks what a defendant would not
have done. Again, the "reject the plea" standard would only require defendants to show that they
would not have pleaded guilty to the terms they in fact pleaded guilty to. Thus, it would not require
them to show that they would have--or even could have-struck a better deal with the government.
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their charges there. 190 That being the case, the "insist upon trial" materiality
standard purports to mirror Brady's materiality standard at trial, reversing a
conviction whenever a reasonable probability exists that the defendant may
be innocent. 191 The idea, in short, is that if defendants are truly innocent, they
will use Brady disclosure to assert their innocence at trial.
Considering the "insist upon trial" materiality standard in light of the plea
bargaining defendant's decision-making dynamics discussed above is both
feasible and illuminating, but using our model requires an extra logical step.
At least at first glance, the model previously employed does not account for
an "insist upon trial" option; it only presents a defendant's decision-making
calculus with regards to a particular plea. To say that a defendant would
insist upon trial, however, is just another way of saying that the defendant
would prefer trial to any plea. 192 In other words, the defendant who would
insist upon trial is one who would choose trial over each and every offer a
prosecutor might conceivably make. That being the case, the showing
required by the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is not so difficult to
model after all: we just need to identify the point at which there is no
sentencing differential high enough to make pleading guilty a defendant's
best option.
Given what we already know about the plea bargaining defendant's
decision-making dynamics, finding the point at which defendants "insist
upon trial" (albeit imprecisely) is not difficult. As previously discussed, a
defendant's estimated chance of conviction at trial determines the size of the
sentencing differential needed to make pleading guilty that defendant's best
option. 193 The lower the chance of conviction at trial, the higher the
differential must be-and this is true regardless of a defendant's factual guilt.
At some point, of course, the chance of conviction at trial will be so low that
even an exceptionally large differential could not force a. plea; again, to the
extent defendants are certain they will be acquitted at trial, they will reject
even the sweetest of deals. 194 At every other point, however, even the
innocent defendant has an incentive to plead guilty, if the price is right. 195

190. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Hill v. Lockhart made this point explicitly, explaining that a
defendant's ability to meet the "insist upon trial" prejudice standard for post-guilty plea ineffective
assistance of counsel claims depended largely on whether the violation would have changed the
outcome at trial, had the defendant chosen trial in the first place. Hill, 474 U.S. at 60.
191. See supra notes 98-1 00 and accompanying text.
192. Seen in this way, a defendant's decision to insist upon trial is actually a number of decisions
rejecting every plea bargain that might be otherwise made.
193. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
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That price will be higher than the guilty defendant's minimum demand, and
prosecutors may not be willing (or able) to pay ie 96-but it exists. Thus,
although the particular point at which a defendant would reject every deal is
impossible to define with precision, and although that point will come earlier
for defendants who are innocent than those who are guilty (the latter being
more willing to plea bargain to start with), our model at least tells us its
general location: where the chance of conviction at trial is exceedingly
low.I97
Given that realization, the problem with using the "insist upon trial"
materiality standard to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims becomes clear:
defendants can only meet it where the suppressed Brady evidence is strong
enough to plummet the chance of conviction at trial. Indeed, in practice, the
result is just what our model predicts; only where the suppressed Brady
evidence is strong enough to make acquittal at trial inevitable are courts
willing to invalidate a defendant's plea. 198 Whenever Brady evidence is that

196. A prosecutor's ability to make the low-ball offers necessary to induce innocent defendants to
plead guilty is limited to some extent by external constraints such as office policy or political
pressures. See Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure, supra· note 3, at 299 (recognizing that prosecutors are
responsible to superiors and public). In addition, prosecutors are making the same cost-benefit
assessments that defendants are, so if the offer necessary to induce .a plea is too lenient, prosecutors
may well determine that they could do better at trial regardless of its attendant costs and risks. See
supra notes I06-10 and accompanying text.
197. Even when the chance of conviction is exceedingly low, pleading guilty may be a
defendant's best option if the consequences of a conviction at trial are.intolerable. An obvious example
is where a defendant faces the death penalty if convicted at trial, precisely the Circumstances at issue in
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 55-58 (discussing the
facts of Brady v. United States).
198. See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322-24 (2d Cir. 1998) (setting aside
defendant's plea where prosecutor suppressed information indicating that another person committed
the offenses); Lewis v. United States, 985 F. Supp. 654, 657-58 (S.D. W. Va. 1997) (setting aside
defendant's plea-based conviction for mail fraud where prosecutor suppressed information showing
defendant never used the United States Postal Service to deliver the fraudulent document); Carroll v.
State, 474 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the defendant was entitled to withdraw a
guilty plea to vehicular homicide where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that road
conditions contributed to the accident and that the state could not determine the defendant's speed);
State v. Gardner, 885 P.2d 1144 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the defendant was entitled to
withdraw a vehicular manslaughter plea where prosecutor suppressed eyewitness testimony that
victim's death was caused by a tire blowout and not the defendant's fatigue or drug use); State v.
Johnson, 544 So. 2d 767, 773 (La. Ct. App. 1989) (determining that the defendant's guilty plea to
distribution of marijuana was invalid where prosecutor suppressed alibi information); Lee v. State, 573
S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (determining that the defendant was entitled to withdraw a
guilty plea where prosecutor suppressed evidence that victim made a false identification in the photo
lineup and was shown a picture of defendant before identifying the defendant in person); People v.
Curry, 627 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215-16 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that the defendant was entitled to
withdraw a guilty plea to possession of controlled substance where the prosecutor suppressed
videotaped evidence of a police officer shaking down drug dealers, stealing their money, and selling
stolen drugs); Gibson v. State, 514 S.E.2d 320, 325-26 (S.C. 1999) (holding that the defendant's
manslaughter plea must be set aside where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that a
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strong, however, prosecutors will most likely lack the authority and
inclination to pursue a conviction in the first place. After all, a defendant's
charge must at least be supported by probable cause, 199 and already
overburdened prosecutors have little incentive to devote their time and
attention to a loser case. 200 Thus, for charges that are prosecuted at all, the
chance of conviction at trial will almost always be a real enough possibility
for defendants to conclude that at some point, a plea bargain is their best
option. In short, choice theory tells us (and reality confirms) that the
defendant who would insist upon trial with Brady disclosure is truly rare
because cases where suppressed Brady evidence is that strong seldom
exist.201
Practicalities aside, the "insist upon trial" materiality standard .is also
problematic because it results in defendants having to prove their innocence.
Assuming (as we must) that trial provides a reasonably accurate means of
determining a defendant's guilt, the chance of acquittal at trial corresponds to
the chance we believe a defendant may be innocent. 202 That being the case,
requiring defendants to show a small chance of conviction at trial equates to
requiring them to show a small chance of factual guilt, which is just another
way of saying that defendants must establish they are probably not guilty.
Thus, while the "insist upon trial" materiality standard purports to reverse a
conviction whenever Brady evidence creates a "reasonable probability" of
innocence (as does Brady's materiality standard at trial)/ 03 in fact it is much
more demanding. 204
In part, forcing guilty plea defendants to show they are probably not
guilty is troubling because it conflicts with Supreme Court precedent. As the

key eyewitness could not possibly have seen what she was expected to testify to at trial); Ex part~
Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that the defendant's guilty plea was
invalid where prosecutor suppressed information tending to show that the defendant was incompetent
to stand trial and insane at the time of the offense). See also supra note 175.
199. See U.S. CONST. amend IV.
200. Prosecutorial resources are limited. and already overtaxed, which is part of the reason
prosecutors bargain in the first place. See supra note I 05.
201. This is not to say that such cases never exist. As Professor McMunigal recognizes, the very
existence of Brady cases shows that some charges are nevertheless prosecuted. See McMunigal, supra
note 16, at 993-94 (noting. countervailing factors that may incline a prosecutor to pursue particularly
weak cases, such as a defendant's bad record or other criminal activity).
202. We can never truly know' ~heiher a defendant is factually guilty or innocent, so the only
benchmark we can use is the anticipated result of trial. At trial, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
burden of proof tells us that defendants should be acquitted when we believe they may be innocent.
Hence, discussing the chance of acquittal at trial is just a proxy for discussing the chance we believe a
defendant may be innocent.
203. See supra notes 98-1 00 and accompanying text.
204. One could, of course, argue that the insist upon trial materiality standard should be more
demanding, a point considered infra text accompanying notes 215-24.
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Court has recently explained, a "reasonable probability:' of a different result
at trial does not mean the result there would probably have been different. 205
To a large extent, however, the trouble with forcing guilty plea defendants to
show they are probably not guilty is more fundamental, implicating the
accuracy interests that Brady is designed to promote. Clearly, the "insist
upon trial" materiality standard will protect defendants who are obviously
innocent (or at least enough like the innocent to warrant treating them as
such). For defendants who may well be innocent, however, the "insist upon
trial" standard will offer no protection at all. Again, as long as the chance of
conviction at trial remains a real possibility, even innocent defendants will
not find themselves in the enviable position of being able to insist upon trial
at any cost. Thus, while the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is
effective in protecting only the innocent, it does not protect them enough.
That being the case, the "insist upon trial" standard is an inappropriate choice
for maximizing the accuracy-enhancing potential that justifies Brady's
application in the plea bargaining context in the first place.
B. The "Reject the Plea " Materiality Standard
Although the above analysis concluded that Brady disclosure will seldom
cause a defendant to insist upon trial, the likelihood that disclosure will cause
a defendant to reject a particular plea remains to be determined. Before
turning to that issue, however, a point of clarification is in order. When
asking whether Brady disclosure would have led a defendant to reject a plea
(or at least whether it would have had a reasonable probability of doing so),
the question is not whether disclosure after the fact would cause a defendant
to want a better deal (surely it would), but rather whether disclosure
beforehand would cause a defendant to want a better deal before agreeing to
plead guilty. The analysis, then, is prospective in nature and focused on only
one plea bargain, the one the defendant actually took.
From the analysis thus far, we know that Brady's effect on a defendant's
decision to accept or reject a particular plea depends on the extent to which it
lowers the estimated chance of conviction at trial. 206 By lowering the chance
of conviction at trial, Brady· disclosure increases the minimum sentencing
differential (i.e., the minimum discount in punishment) needed to make
pleading guilty a defendant's best option. Whether that new differential is
substantial enough to affect a defendant's decision-making with regards to a
particular plea depends on the strength of the Brady information itself. In

205. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434 (1995).
206. See supra text accompanying note 136.
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short, Brady disclosure will undoubtedly ·reduce the attractiveness of any
given plea offer; the question is whether that plea offer is still attractive
enough.
Sometimes Brady disclosure will lower the chance of conviction at trial
(and hence raise a defendant's sentencing differential demand) only slightly
so that a particular plea offer is still a good deal for a defendant, though not
as good a deal as it was before. 207 Defendants finding themselves in this
situation would take the plea anyway and hence would not meet the "reject
the plea" materiality standard-exactly the result we want where Brady
information is too weak to significantly affect the probability that a defendant
would be convicted at trial. 208 Other times, however, Brady information will
be stronger, lowering the chance of conviction at trial enough to affect a
defendant's willingness to take a particular plea?09 Although it is impossible
to precisely identify this point (and in any event it would be different for
innocent and guilty defendants), 210 it is unlikely that any defendant would be
willing to accept the same deal originally pleaded to where Brady disclosure
created a reasonable probability of acquittal at trial. After all, if Brady
information is strong enough to suggest that a defendant may be innocent, a
plea offer would have to account for that fact-and more--to remain that
defendant's best option.211

207. The Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir. 1998),
provides such an example. In Avellino, the court held that the government's suppression of a perjury
conviction against one of its witnesses was not material where that witness had "an atrocious criminal
record" of which the defendant was aware, including convictions for high-jacking, burglary, arson, and
murder. See id. at 258.
208. Under these circumstances, the term "Brady information" is technically inappropriate
because if information favorable to the defense is not material, it is by definition not Brady
information at all. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263,281 (1999) (recognizing the distinction).
209. The strength of the Brady information necessary to affect a defendant's willingness to tRke a
particular plea will depend on the other evidence against a defendant. If that evidence is weak, for
example, then even relatively weak Brady information could affect the attractiveness of a given plea; if
the evidence in a prosecutor's case is otherwise strong, however, the Brady information will need to be
stronger to have the same effect. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-13 (1976) (noting that
materiality assessment should consider other evidence supporting a defendant's guilt). See also supra
note 179 (discussing application of Agurs in plea bargaining context).
210. Recall that innocent and guilty defendants have different plea bargaining proclivities. See
supra text accompanying notes 117-21.
211. Theoretically, it is possible for Brady disclosure to create a reasonable probability of
acquittal at trial but not affect a defendant's plea decision. However, this result is only possible where
prosecutors make offers much more lenient than defendants without Brady information would demand,
and there is no reason to believe they would be so .felicitous. Because of the large percentage of cases
that are plea bargained, see supra note 2, prosecutors are negotiators as much as they are trial lawyers.
Thus, prosecutors are well versed in the art of getting the most-as opposed to the least-punishment
possible out of a given plea bargaining situation.
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To conclude that Brady disclosure may in.some instances lead defendants
to reject a particular plea, however, is not to say that in those instances they
would necessarily insist upon trial. Whether defendants would actually insist
upon trial in light of newly-disclosed Brady evidence depends on the extent
to which Brady disclosure lowers the chance of conviction at trial. Under the
"reject the plea" standard, the chance of conviction at trial need not be so low
that defendants would reject every plea; it just has to be low enough for
defendants to reject the one they in fact pleaded to. Of course, the stronger
the Brady evidence, the more likely it would be to have both effects, but the
"reject the plea" standard would not require that result. Given practical
considerations, the distinction is significant. If incentives to plea bargain exist
at (nearly) every turn as I have argued,212 there is every reason to believe that
after Brady disclosure, the parties could still make themselves better off by
striking a deal. Again, the cases that prosecutors most want to deal are the
weak ones they believe they would lose at trial. 213 Thus, when a particular
offer will not meet a defendant's sentencing differential demand because of
Brady disclosure, a prosecutor has every reason to make another offer that
will. In reality, then, Brady disclosure might reduce the chance of conviction
at trial enough for a defendant to insist upon trial in a few cases, but more
often it will just affect the terms of the bargain struck. 214
Clearly, the "reject the plea" materiality standard is less demanding than
the "insist upon trial" materiality standard. That ·difference, in fact, is the
reason the "reject the plea" standard best matches Brady's materiality
standard at trial. 215 Even so, it is worth considering whether Brady's
materiality standard in the plea bar~aining context should be higher than the
materiality standard used at trial. 21 After all, defendants raising post-guilty
plea Brady claims have, by defmition, already said they are guilty once, and
those being honest about that fact would also fmd the "reject the plea"

212. See supra notes 104-12 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying note I 06.
214. See Schulhofer, supra note 3, at 1984 (contending that lowering information barriers will not
keep innocent defendants from pleading guilty). Annecdotal evidence supports this conclusion. See,
e.g., United States v. James, 960 F.2d 147, 1992 WL 80318, at *I (4th Cir. 1992) (unpublished table
decision) (considering the defendant's argument that had he received Brady information, he may have
been able to negotiate a more favorable plea agreement); Mustread v. Gilmore, 966 F.2d 1148, 1152
(7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the defendant already knew that the victim was changing her story and
used that information to negotiate a plea to a lesser charge). See also supra note 185; infra note 226.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100,210-1 I.
216. The higher "insist upon trial" standard could be seen as a concession for recognizing postguilty plea Brady claims in the first place-a way to protect the finality of guilty pleas and the
obviously innocent guilty plea defendant too. It merits noting, however, that courts using the "insist
upon trial" standard do not justify it in this manner. Rather, they see the standard as comporting with
the materiality standard used for Brady claims at trial. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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standard easier to meet Given the potential windfall to guilty defendants who
prevail on their post-plea· Brady claims,217 one might well conclude that
when a defendant has pleaded guilty, who cares if the government gets a
better deal than it would have had Brady disclosure been made? 218
Framing the question this way, however, misses the point. The virtue of
the "reject the plea" standard is not that it keeps the government from striking
a particularly favorable deal, but that it allows .us to be confident in the
accuracy of a defendant's plea. 219 That confidence is only possible if the
materiality standard for post-plea Brady claims reverses a conviction
whenever our confidence in a defendant's guilt is seriously shaken-i.e.,
whenever a defendant shows a reasonable probability that Brady disclosure
would have resulted in an acquittal ·at trial. 220 As discussed above, only the
"reject the plea" standard· achieves this result; 221 the "insist upon trial"
standard is too demanding. 222 That being the case, the fact that a defendant
might ultimately choose to use Brady disclosure to strike another, more
favorable deal, is irrelevant; if pleading guilty (again) makes innocent
defendants better off, we should fully support that result. 223 As for the
factually guilty defendants who will also benefit from the lower "reject the
plea" standard, we should consider them the inevitable byproduct of our core
criminal justice philosophy-that adequate protection of the innocent is
worth some unintended protection of the guilty as well. 224
As a practical matter, however, we can be only minimally disturbed about
the idea of defendants using an established Brady claim to negotiate a
favorable plea because they do that now. Defendants who win on a post-trial
Brady claim get a new trial, but nothing stops them from striking a deal on
remand instead225-artd that is exactly what some defendants do. 226

217. See supra text accompanying notes 150-S 1.
218. Given the fact that public opinion thinks plea'bargaining results in dispositions that are too
lax, see Scott & Stuntz, supra note 2, at 1909 n.4, the point has even more force.
219. One might also answer that it is fundamentally unfair to hold anyone to a bargain-at least
one that results in the deprivation of liberty-that they did not really mean to make. Contract theory
would support this position. See Scott & Stuntz,' supra note 2, at 1957-60 (applying the contract notion
of unilateral mistake to the plea bargaining context); Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1609-10 (considering
the contract law doctrines of mistake and duress in making a case for pre-plea disclosure). This
explanation, however, brings us back to the notion of a truly consensual (i.e., voluntary and intelligent)
plea, which the Supreme Court has not found necessary to sustain a plea-based conviction. See supra
text accompanying notes 38-39.
220. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 134.
224. See supra notes 154-SS and accompanying text.
225. Technically, there is no right to plead guilty, see North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38
n.11 (1970), so a court on remand could simply refuse to accept the defendant's guilty plea, thereby
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Similarly, defendants who win on a post-plea Brady claim have no obligation
to insist upon trial as the materiality standard currently used suggests ·they
will, assuming on remand that the government is even interested in reprosecuting the case. 227 Given these considerations, at least the "reject the
plea" materiality standard is realistic in accounting for the fact that plea
bargaining can make a defendant (even if innocent) better off, matching the
materiality requirement for post-plea Brady claims with the remedy
defendants prevailing on those claims would actually receive. 228 Because the
whole point of Brady's materiality standard is to tell us when the problem of
suppressed favorable evidence is serious enough to remedy, harmonizing the
two concepts is, under any scenario, the clearly preferable choice. 229
In all fairness, it may not matter to prosecutors which materiality standard
courts choose to judge post-guilty plea Brady claims. Because they are wellpracticed in complying with Brady at trial, prosecutors may just continue to
ask themselves whether disclosing certain information could have made a
difference there. 23 For the defendant who asserts a post-guilty plea Brady
claim, however, the difference is an important one, and that difference has
equally important implications for the accuracy of convictions supported by a

°

forcing a trial. As a practical matter, though, courts have no reason to do that; their the over-crowded
trial docket makes resolving cases by plea bargain just as attractive to judges as it is to the parties
themselves. See Sheppard, supra note 43, at 172.
226. Unfortunately, there appears to be no information as to what percentage of Brady violations
following trial (or a plea, for that matter) ultimately result in guilty pleas. There is, however, anecdotal
evidence that it happens. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 856 F. Supp. 1293, 1294 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(noting that the government entered into plea agreements with the defendants after their trial
convictions were overturned due to Brady violations). Given the added costs and uncertainties of a
trial on remand, see supra note 150 and accompanying text, the incentives to plea bargain Brady cases
the second time around are considerable, suggesting that the practice occurs more often than the cases
might indicate. See supra notes I 04-06 and accompanying text.
227. See supra note 150 and accompanying text. I have found no case forcing a defendant who
can meet the "insist upon trial" materiality standard to actually do so on remand, and the same
practical considerations that would prevent a judge from forcing a trial on remand after a trial-based
conviction is reversed would apply when a conviction that rests on a plea is reversed. See supra note
225. See also supra notes 212-14 and accompanying text (discussing incentives to plea bargain even
after Brady disclosure has been made).
228. Invalidating a defendant's conviction based on a plea negates both the conviction and the
plea so that defendants on remand are in their pre-plea positions-exactly where they would be if they
had rejected the plea they actually pleaded to.
229. Thus, if we really believe the "insist upon trial" materiality standard is appropriate for postplea Brady claims, we should force defendants on remand to either stick with the original plea or take
their case to trial. Doing so, however, would prevent the parties from making themselves better off, a
result that may be particularly harsh for the government. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
230. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 494 (noting that in the pretrial context, many prosecutors just
ask whether the information is favorable to the defendant). After all, until a defendant actually pleads
guilty, a prosecutor cannot entirely rule out the possibility of going to trial. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
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plea. Of course, even if Brady's post-plea materiality standard is destined to
require defendants to show they would have insisted upon trial, all is not lost;
even limited protection is better than none. 231 Still, it is important to
recognize that, were we writing on a clean slate, the "insist upon trial"
standard is not the ideal choice for maximizing the accuracy interests that
justify Brady's application in the plea bargaining context in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
Using modern choice theory to examine the plea bargaining defendant's
decision-making dynamics elucidates at least two truths. First, innocent
defendants sometimes plead guilty even though they could contest their guilt
at trial, and they do so because pleading guilty is in their best interest.
Second, Brady plays a crucial role in preventing guilty pleas by innocent
defendants, just as Brady plays a crucial role in preventing the conviction of
innocent defendants at trial. Should the Supreme Court ultimately recognize
these truths, however, it will not likely choose a materiality standard for postguilty plea Brady claims that maximizes Brady's accuracy-enhancing
potential. Assuming doctrinal consistency would lead the Court to employ
Hill v. Lockhart's "insist upon trial" standard instead, post-plea Brady claims
will continue to provide little more than illusory protection for the plea
bargaining defendant.
Protecting the defendant who plea bargains, however, is just as
important-if not more so-as protecting the defendant who contests guilt at
trial. In the plea bargaining context, there is no neutral arbiter to ensure that
the government negotiates fairly, no array of trial rights to protect the
innocent, and no showing of the government's cards to assure us that the
conviction was a "sure-thing" anyway. 232 Indeed, Brady's importance in the
plea bargaining context i.s clear in part just because so many cases are
resolved there. 233 After all, the. accuracy that our formal criminal justice
system endeavors to secure is of limited practical import-ninety percent of
the time, the plea bargaining context is the only context that matters. 234

231. See Douglass, supra note 14, at 493.
232. See Ostrow, supra note 20, at 1581 (recognizing the lack of constitutional and statutory
protections surrounding a defendant's decision to bargain or stand trial); Sheppard, supra note 43, at
201 (noting the unstructured and unsupervised nature of plea bargaining).
233. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. This point is especially strong given the incentives
prosecutors have to funnel weak cases-those we most expect to have Brady information-to the plea
bargaining context. See supra text accompanying note 147.
234. See supra note 2.

